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1. Introduction 
Decentralization, that is, delegation of decision-making from higher to lower 
organizational levels, is beneficial for firms in many ways.1 Theoretically, these benefits 
include better adaptation to the business environment owing to more efficient use of 
local knowledge (Holmström 1984; Dessein 2002; Hart and Moore 2005; Dessin and 
Santos 2006; Alonso et al. 2008), speedier decision-making because of more efficient 
information processing (Radner 1993; Bolton and Dewatripont 1994), and an increase 
in job satisfaction/motivation and effort of workers to whom authority is delegated 
(Aghion and Tirole 1997; Zábojník 2002). Empirically, Fehr et al. (2013) have 
confirmed the last motivation-enhancing effect of delegation in a laboratory experiment. 
Appelbaum et al. (2000, Chapter 9) also find a positive association between delegation 
to non-managerial employees and employee job satisfaction. 
Despite these benefits, firms do not always pursue decentralization, and the 
degree of delegation varies substantially across locations and industries. For example, 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 display the variation across countries and industries, respectively, in 
the degree of discretion that the average non-managerial and non-supervisory worker 
can choose or change their way of work.2 The degree of decentralization in this aspect 
ranges from Russia’s 2.41 to Finland’s 3.80, where the degree is measured on a 5-point 
scale: 1 = not at all (choose/change the way of own work); 2 = very little; 3 = to some 
extent; 4 = to a high extent; 5 = to a very high extent (Figure 1.1). Regional variations 
are much greater: the corresponding average scores range from 1.72 in Altai Krai, 
Russia, to 4.05 in Bremen, Germany. As Figure 1.2 shows, the corresponding scores 
also vary across industries, ranging from 2.57 in textile-related manufacturing to 3.75 in 
computer-related services.  
1 For the summary on the benefits and costs of delegation, see Colombo and Delmastro (2008, 
Chapter 2), Bloom and Van Reenen (2011, section 5.4.2), and Gibbons et al. (2012). 
2 This aspect is one of the seven elements of delegation examined in this paper’s empirical 
analysis. Similar variations are observed when examining other elements.  
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What explains these variations in the actual degree of decentralization? One 
important reason is that decentralization is not pursued in countries/regions or industries 
in which the expected costs of delegation are relatively large. Theoretically, such costs 
mainly include (i) loss of control (Holmström 1984; Aghion and Tirole 1997; Dessein 
2002; Alonso et al. 2008) and (ii) difficulty in coordination (Bolton and Dewatripont 
1994; Hart and More 2005; Dessin and Santos 2006; Alonso et al. 2008). First, 
delegation generally results in difficulty in monitoring agents’ behaviors. As the 
interests of the principal (firm) and the agent (worker) increasingly misalign, the 
possibility of workers’ rent-seeking behaviors, which are harmful for firm profit, 
increases. Second, when coordinating worker behaviors is important for firm profit, 
decentralization is costly because adaptation to local conditions is prioritized over 
coordination under decentralization. 
This paper focuses mainly on these two costs of decentralization as 
determinants of its implementation. 3  First, the size of expected cost owing to 
rent-seeking behaviors is measured by region-specific social capital that proxies 
self-centeredness of workers. Second, the magnitude of cost owing to difficulty in 
coordination is measured by industry-specific coordination needs. Based on the 
theoretical framework by Alonso et al. (2008), I empirically examine the effect of these 
two cost measures on the degree of delegation to non-managerial and non-supervisory 
workers utilizing worker-level data from 14 countries. The following theory-consistent 
results are obtained: First, the degree of decentralization is lower when its costs are 
higher (i.e., when industry’s need for coordination is higher or when region’s average 
self-centeredness of workers is higher). Second, the negative association between 
coordination needs and decentralization is mitigated in regions with lower 
3 Other factors that affect the degree of decentralization by changing the benefits and costs of 
delegation, such as worker skill, use of information and communication technology (ICT), firm 
size, and the competitiveness of product market, are controlled for in the empirical analysis.  
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self-centeredness of workers. Third, in industries with very low coordination needs, the 
degree of decentralization is high and does not depend on the level of self-centeredness 
of workers. Similarly, in regions where self-centeredness of workers is very low, the 
degree of delegation is always high, regardless of the industry’s coordination needs. As 
mentioned below, the second and third findings are empirically new. These results are 
robust to alternative indices of decentralization, an industry’s coordination needs, and 
self-centeredness of workers. The possibility of endogeneity bias is minimized because 
the region-specific and industry-specific cost measures used in this paper are likely to 
be exogenous to individual firms. In addition, the endogeneity test results indicate that 
the social capital variable (proxy for worker self-centeredness) can be treated as 
exogenous. 
The lower-level self-centeredness of workers is considered to raise firm profit 
through more information sharing (i.e., less inefficiencies caused by imperfect 
information) and better coordination among workers, and less biased decision making 
of each worker from the firm’s perspective. These are exactly the main channels through 
which social capital improves efficiency of the group (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2005: 
1652–1658).4 When self-centeredness of workers is very low, decentralization is chosen 
because it yields higher profit than centralization even when coordination is extremely 
important. When coordination is important, each worker recognizes it and thus 
coordinates well by exchanging better-quality information, which raises firm profit 
under decentralization. By contrast, the quality of communication becomes worse under 
centralization with an increase in coordination needs (see Section 2 for more detail). 
This study contributes to the literature in three main ways. First, to the author’s 
knowledge, this study is the first to test the theoretical predictions of Alonso et al. 
4 As Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005: 1644) summarize, previous studies generally regard social 
capital as something that “generates positive externalities for members of a group” through 
“shared trust, norms, and values” that “arise from informal forms of organizations based on social 
networks and associations.” 
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(2008) empirically. Past empirical studies find a negative association between 
coordination needs and the degree of decentralization (Colombo and Delmastro 2004; 
McElheran 2014; Meagher and Wait 2014). However, Alonso et al. (2008) theoretically 
shows that even when coordination is extremely important, decentralization is optimal if 
the degree of misalignment of interests between principal and agent are sufficiently 
small. Such interaction effects of coordination needs and the misalignment of interests 
are empirically examined in this paper for the first time.  
Second, this study also contributes to the growing literature on the effect of 
culture (or social capital) on economic activities (Guiso et al. 2006, 2011; Durlauf and 
Fafchamps 2005; Fernández 2011; Alesina and Giuliano 2015). In particular, this paper 
is closely related to Bloom et al. (2012), Appelbaum et al. (2000, Chapter 9), and 
Cingano and Pinnotti (2016). By examining firm data in the United States (US), Europe, 
and Asia, Bloom et al. (2012) empirically show that firms headquartered in high-trust 
regions delegate more authorities to plant managers and that higher levels of bilateral 
trust between the country of headquarter and that of subsidiary increases 
decentralization. Appelbaum et al. (2000, Chapter 9) also find a positive association 
between delegation to non-managerial employees (“greater opportunity to participate”) 
and their trust to managers in three manufacturing industries in the US. However, both 
papers do not examine the effect of coordination needs nor social capital measures other 
than trust. By contrast, the current paper shows that the effect of trust on 
decentralization depends on the importance of coordination. In fact, trust does not 
matter for decentralization when coordination needs are very low. The results in this 
paper also indicate that “trust” may be interpreted as the degree of self-centeredness of 
workers because alternative social capital variables (participation in volunteer activities 
and attitude on wealth accumulation) are also found to be significant determinants of 
decentralization. These remarks also apply to Cingano and Pinnotti (2016) who examine 
industry-level data across Italian regions and European countries. They find that higher 
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regional- (or country-) level trust is associated with a larger share of value-added and 
export in delegation-intensive industries. They treat the industry’s degree of 
decentralization as exogenous, while I assume and empirically show that the degree of 
decentralization is determined by social capital (e.g., trust) and coordination needs.  
The third contribution of this study is its data characteristics. The data in the 
current paper cover both manufacturing and service industries across 14 countries in 
Europe (including Russia and Eastern Europe) and Asia. By contrast, the coverage of 
most studies that examine the determinants of decentralization are limited, especially in 
terms of the country coverage, although a few exceptions exist; for example, Bloom et 
al. (2012) cover manufacturing firms in 12 countries in US, Europe, and Asia.5 Another 
uniqueness of the current study is the use of worker-level data. Previous studies on the 
determinants of decentralization generally use firm or establishment level dataset 
(Colombo and Delmastro 2004; Bloom et al. 2012; McElheran 2014; Meagher and Wait 
2014; studies cited in the Tables 2.2a in Colombo and Delmastro 2008). By examining 
worker-level data, this paper is able to examine the effects of individual characteristics 
on the degree of decentralization.6 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly explains the 
model by Alonso et al. (2008) regarding firm decentralization/centralization choice. 
Section 3 presents the empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data. The estimation 
results on the benefits and determinants of decentralization are reported, respectively, in 
Sections 5 and 6 and Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
5 Graham et al. (2015) also cover European and Asian CFOs, although their main empirical 
analysis is based on US CEOs. 
6 Graham et al. (2015) examine the effect of CEO’s characteristics (and a few characteristics of 
managers) on the degree of decentralization. However, the examined characteristics are limited. 
In addition, they do not examine delegation to lower-level workers. 
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2. A Model Explaining the Decentralization/Centralization Choice 
Alonso et al. (2008) build a model that explains how the two major costs of 
decentralization (loss of control and coordination failure) influence the firm’s 
decision-making patterns, that is, decentralized or centralized decision making. Their 
model considers an organization with two divisions and one headquarter, and examines 
how the decision rights are allocated between a headquarter manager and two division 
managers. I directly apply their model to my empirical setting simply by changing the 
“two division managers” in their model to “two non-managerial and non-supervisory 
workers.” Delegation to the lowest-rank workers in the organization is examined, 
primarily because my data on decentralization are mainly concerned with narrow-scope 
decisions related to the person’s daily business operations (see Section 4.2.1). By 
contrast, empirical studies that examine the degree of delegation to managers usually 
analyze more wide-scope strategic decisions, such as those on mergers and acquisition, 
capital investment, hiring and dismissal of employees, introduction of new product, 
technology, and work organization (Colombo and Delmastro 2004; Bloom et al. 2012; 
Meagher and Wait 2014; Graham et al. 2015). 
I briefly explain the model of Alonso et al. (2008) with slight notational 
changes. Consider a hypothetical firm consisting of a headquarter (HQ) manager and 
two workers }2,1{∈i . There are two decisions, 1d  and 2d , which are related to the 
tasks of workers 1 and 2, respectively. These decisions are made by either the HQ 
manager in the case of centralization or by each worker in the case of decentralization. 
Decision rights are allocated to maximize the sum of expected profits generated by 
workers 1 and 2, ][E 21 ππ + . Profits of worker i ( iπ ) are defined as follows: 
}2,1{)()( 22 ∈∀−−−−= i   ddδθdKπ jiiiii , 
where iK  is the maximum profits realizable, iθ  is the local conditions each worker 
faces, jd  is the decision on other task (if i = 1, then j = 2, or vice versa). iθ  is 
privately observed by worker i, but its distribution is common knowledge. ii θd =  
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means perfect adaptation to the local condition and ji dd =  means perfect 
coordination between decisions 1 and 2. Each worker’s profits are increasing in both 
adaptation and coordination, but there is a trade-off between them. The parameter 
),0[ ∞∈δ  captures the relative importance of coordination for the profits.  
 Each worker strategically sends messages im  to the HQ manager under 
centralization (vertical communication), or to the other worker under decentralization 
(horizontal communication), to influence decision making in her favor. These 
communications take the form of “cheap-talk.” Under centralization, the HQ manager 
chooses the optimal decisions 1d  and 2d  to maximize the expected overall profits 
given the messages received ]|[E 21 mππ + , where )( 21 m,mm ≡ . Under 
decentralization, each worker chooses the optimal decision id  that maximizes 
]|)1([E iji m,θπλλπ −+ . The key here is the presence of ]1,2/1[  ∈λ , which is the 
weight each worker gives to her own profits. This parameter λ  (called “own-division 
bias” in Alonso et al. [2008]) captures the degree of misaligned interests between the 
HQ and each worker. In the current paper, I call this λ  the degree of workers’ 
self-centeredness.  
Under the above setting, Alonso et al. (2008) show the following: (i) when 
coordination need δ  and self-centeredness of workers λ  are both sufficiently large, 
both δ  and λ  are negatively correlated with decentralization; (ii) when δ  is 
sufficiently small, decentralization is optimal regardless of λ ; and (iii) when λ  is 
sufficiently small, decentralization is optimal, regardless of δ  (see Proposition 5, 
Figure 6, and Section VI of Alonso et al. [2008]). As mentioned in the Introduction, 
previous literature predicts the negative associations of both δ  and λ  with the 
degree of decentralization. A particularly novel finding of their model is (iii), which 
shows that even when the need for coordination is extremely high, decentralization 
outperforms centralization when the self-centeredness of workers is sufficiently low.  
This (iii) occurs because an increased need for coordination improves the 
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quality of communication under decentralization, but worsens that under centralization. 
Under decentralization, each worker recognizes the importance of coordination for her 
own profit and thus, exchanges more precise information with each other, which results 
in better coordination and greater firm profit. By contrast, under centralization, each 
worker anticipates that the HQ manager would give too much weight to coordination 
and thus, over-reports her state to induce a decision better adapted to her local 
conditions. Less precise information on local conditions results in poor adaptation and a 
reduction in firm profit. Through this mechanism, the expected profit under 
decentralization becomes larger than that under centralization, when the degree of 
self-centeredness of workers (λ ) is sufficiently small. When λ  is large (and δ  is 
also sufficiently large), centralization outperforms decentralization. This is because 
larger λ  leads to less precise communication and more biased decision making under 
decentralization. 7  Put differently, lower self-centeredness of workers (small λ ) 
increases efficiency through better coordination by improving the quality of information 
and through decisions more closely aligned with the firm’s interests.  
 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
Based on the model in the previous section, I empirically examine whether 
workers’ self-centeredness and need for coordination actually influence the degree of 
decentralization. In particular, I primarily estimate the following equation:  
rjcrjcijr SocKIndCoordSocKIndCoordDecent *321 βββα +++=  
,21 ijrcjjcijr FFZX εγγ +++++                       (3.1) 
7 An increase in λ  leads to lower qualities of both vertical and horizontal communication. 
However, since each worker’s interest is more closely aligned with the HQ manager than the 
other worker who is biased toward own profit, the negative effect of λ on the communication 
quality is smaller under centralization.  
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where subscripts i, j, r, and c denote worker (non-managerial and non-supervisory 
worker), industry, region, and country, respectively. ijrDecent  stands for the degree of 
delegation to the worker. jcIndCoord  represents the degree of coordination needs of 
industry j in country c. rSocK  is the region-specific social capital that proxies the 
degree of self-centeredness of the average worker in the region. A higher value of 
rSocK means lower self-centeredness of workers. ijrX  is a vector of worker (and 
workplace) characteristics that may influence the degree of delegation, including gender, 
age and its square (or years of work experience and its square, and years of tenure at the 
current employer and its square), years of education, literacy and numeracy skills 
(proficiency scores), health status, immigrant-related dummies (whether born abroad 
and the native language is foreign), occupation dummies, skills used at work (reading, 
writing, numeracy, and information and communication technology [ICT]), dummies 
for fulltime work and indefinite employment contract, size of the workplace, and public 
and non-profit organization sector dummies. jcZ  denotes a vector of industry 
characteristics such as export and import ratios that represent the degree of market 
competition of the industry. jF  and cF  denote industry and country dummies. ijrε  
is the error term. In some specifications, region dummies ( rF ) are controlled for instead 
of cF  and, in that case, 2β  is not identified. I also experiment with jIndCoord  
(instead of jcIndCoord ), which does not vary across countries, resulting in an inability 
to identify 1β . A more detailed description of variables appears in the next section and 
in Appendix Table A1.  
All the estimations in this paper use the “repest” command in Stata (Avvisati 
and Keslair 2016), which is specially designed for the PIAAC and other datasets with 
complex survey designs. The repest command uses sampling weight to obtain a point 
estimate that represents the population, and standard errors are estimated using 
jackknife replicate weights. The command also deals with plausible values such as 
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literacy and numeracy proficiency scores.8 I modify the original sampling weight that 
weighs countries according to their population size to the one that gives equal weight to 
(all survey participants in) each country.9 
The model in the previous section leads to the following four predictions: 
(i) 01 <β , that is, a higher need for coordination (IndCoord) is associated with a 
lower degree of decentralization (delegation to workers) in general. 
(ii) 02 >β , that is, lower self-centeredness (i.e., higher SocK) is associated with a 
higher degree of decentralization in general. 
(iii) 03 >β , that is, as the degree of self-centeredness decreases (i.e., as the SocK 
increases), the negative association between IndCoord and decentralization 
weakens.  
(iv) In particular, when IndCoord is very low, the degree of decentralization is always 
high, regardless of SocK. Similarly, when SocK is very high (i.e., the degree of 
self-centeredness is very low), the degree of decentralization is always high, 
regardless of IndCoord. 
 
 
4. Data 
4.1 Main Data Sources and Sample Used  
Individual-level data on the degree of decentralization and worker 
characteristics are taken from the Public Use Files (PUF) of the Programme for the 
International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), conducted by the 
8 The number of replications is 80 without plausible values. When plausible values are used, the 
average estimator across 10 plausible values is reported and the imputation error is additionally 
added when estimating standard errors. For more details, see Avvisati and Keslair (2016) and 
Mohadjer et al. (2013). 
9 This treatment is appropriate when examining the effect of social capital because the variation 
in social capital is especially large between countries. If too much (little) weight is given to 
countries with large (small) populations, then the interesting variation in social capital is 
substantially lost. 
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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2011–2012.10 
During this period, PIAAC surveyed approximately 166,000 adults aged 16–65 years 
from 24 countries (OECD 2015b). PIAAC directly assesses adult skills in literacy, 
numeracy, and problem solving using ICT, surveys various skills used at work and 
home, and collects various background information, including demographic and job 
characteristics. Among 22 countries, for which the PUF are available, 14 countries that 
contain detailed (2-digit level based on ISIC Rev. 4) industry codes for worker’s jobs 
and information on geographical regions are primarily analyzed in the regression 
analysis.11 The number of regions in these countries amounts to at most 142 regions.12  
Industry-level data on jcIndCoord  and jcZ  are constructed from the 2011 
input–output table of each country taken from the OECD Input–Output Database (2015 
edition) (OECD 2015a). As will be mentioned in the next subsection, an alternative 
jIndCoord  is also constructed from the IPUMS American Community Survey (ACS) 
2008–2012 5-year sample (Ruggles et al. 2015). Region-level social capital data is 
constructed from PIAAC as well as the World Values Survey and European Values 
Study data for the period 1989–2011 (WVS-EVS; World Values Survey Association 
2015; European Values Study Foundation 2011). The following subsection details the 
data for industry’s coordination needs and social capital. 
10 I use the PUF for Round-1 countries released in March 2015. In addition, as for the German 
data, the German PIAAC Scientific Use File (Rammstedt et al. 2015), which contains more 
detailed variables, is used as a supplement.  
11 The 14 countries are Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, South 
Korea, Netherlands, Poland, Russia (excluding Moscow municipal area), Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom (UK, England, and Northern Ireland only). The remaining 8 countries 
(Austria, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Belgium [Flanders only], Italy, Norway, and the US) do not 
contain information on geographical regions, and the first four of them do not contain 2-digit 
level industry codes. 
12 Based on the sample in the column (1) of Table 6.1, when using Trust1_piaac. The 
corresponding number of regions is 103, when using Trust1_wvs. The unit of region is the 
OECD’s Territorial level 2 (TL2), when using SocK constructed from PIAAC data. When SocK 
is constructed from WVS-EVS, some TL2 regions are aggregated to be matched with 
WVS-EVS’s region codes.  
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To analyze the delegation to non-managerial and non-supervisory workers 
working at the lowest level of the firm’s hierarchy, I restrict the sample to employees i) 
who are in paid employment (excluding self-employed), ii) whose occupation is neither 
armed forces, legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, nor skilled 
agricultural and fishery workers;13 and iii) who have no employees to supervise or 
manage, either directly or indirectly.  
 
4.2 Construction of Key Variables 
4.2.1 Decent: Decentralization 
I construct two decentralization indices. The first index, Decent1, is 
constructed from the four PIAAC questions that ask to what extent (based on the 
5-point scale) the respondent can choose or change (i) the sequence of her tasks, (ii) 
how she does her work, (iii) the speed or rate of her work, and (iv) her working hours.14 
These four items are used by the PIAAC to construct the variable called TASKDISC 
and indicates the degree of task discretion. The second index, Decent2, is constructed 
from these four questions plus three additional PIAAC questions, that is, the 5-point 
scale frequencies of (v) planning the respondent’s own activities, (vi) organizing her 
own time, and (vii) confronting complex problems that take at least 30 minutes to find a 
good solution.15  
Because scaling may vary across questions, the answer to each question is first 
standardized to have zero mean and one standard deviation. Then, Decent1 and Decent2 
13 That is, sample workers are restricted to those of the following occupation categories: 
technicians and associate professionals; clerks; service workers and shop and market sales 
workers; craft and related trades workers; plant and machine operators and assemblers; and 
elementary occupations. 
14 The answer to each question takes the value of 1 (not at all), 2 (very little), 3 (to some extent), 4 
(to a high extent), or 5 (to a very high extent). 
15 The answers to those questions take the value of 1(never), 2 (less than once a month), 3 (less 
than once a week but at least once a month), 4 (at least once a week but not every day), or 5 
(every day).  
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are constructed as the unweighted average across the corresponding four or seven 
standardized answers. This procedure is similar to that employed by Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007), who constructed an aggregate management practice score from 18 
five-point scale questions.16 As shown in Appendix Table A2, all seven questions are 
positively correlated with one another and the aggregate indices, Decent1 and Decent2, 
are highly positively correlated (the correlation coefficient is 0.894).  
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 arrange country and industry, respectively, in descending 
order of Decent1.17 In both decentralization indices, Northern European countries, 
Japan, and Austria tend to delegate larger authority to lower level workers, whereas 
Russia, the Slovak Republic, Italy, France, Spain, Ireland, and South Korea tend to 
delegate less authority. The US, UK, and Canada lie in the middle. In terms of industry, 
the degree of delegation tends to be higher in many service industries (e.g., real estate, 
computer services, finance, and renting of machinery) and lower in many manufacturing 
(e.g., textile and apparel, rubber and plastic, food, beverages and tobacco) and 
agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing industries. 
 
4.2.2 IndCoord: Coordination Needs of Industries 
 I assume that an industry’s need for coordination is higher when the industry 
has longer production chains, that is, it requires greater amounts of intermediate inputs 
or longer sequences of production stages to produce a final product.18 For example, to 
produce a perfect-quality car and earn high-level profits, coordination between and 
within various divisions (research and development, design, marketing and sales, 
16  Similar aggregation technique is used in Bresnahan et al. (2002) who construct a 
decentralization measure of workplace.  
17 As Appendix Figures A1 and A2 show, similar tendencies are observed in terms of Decent2.  
18 As for firm-specific measures, existing studies use measures such as the size of inter-plant 
transfers within a firm (McElheran 2014), the number of other workplaces producing the same 
product (Meagher and Wait 2014), and dummies for a multi-plant firm and being a subcontractor 
(Colombo and Delmastro 2004). 
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material and parts procurement, and multiple plants) is essential. Each auto part needs to 
be of good quality and fit with other parts, and cost-effective (by utilizing economies of 
scale) at the same time. As suggested by the O-ring theory by Kremer (1993), the 
malfunction probability of a final product increases with the number of parts used. Thus, 
coordination becomes more important for the profit of firms using greater amounts of 
intermediate inputs. By contrast, in apparel manufacturing or financial service industries, 
less intermediate inputs or production stages are required, and thus, coordination 
activities are less intense and less important.  
More precisely, as the primary measure for the industry’s coordination needs 
( jcIndCoord1 ), I use the column sum of the Leontief inverse coefficient of industry j in 
country c in 2011.19 This index is used in Asuyama (2012, 2015) as a measure for the 
industry’s length of production chains and in Fally (2012) as “the number of production 
stages embodied in each product.” The data are taken from an input–output table, which 
is in the form of a 34 industry*34 industry matrix, for each country, constructed by the 
OECD (OECD 2015a). This jcIndCoord1 measures the dollar amount of intermediate 
inputs that are directly or indirectly required to produce one dollar’s worth of industry 
j’s output.  
I also use an alternative measure jIndCoord2 , which is the industry-specific 
skill substitutability (or complementarity) index used in Bombardini et al. (2012). As 
they mention, higher skill complementarity means that poor performance at one task 
reduces the output more significantly and that teamwork is important. Thus, 
coordination is more crucial for profit in industries with higher skill complementarity. 
As jIndCoord2 , the ranking of industries, based on residual wage dispersion 
19 ∑= k kjcjc leonIndCoord1 , where kjcleon is the (k, j)th entry of the Leontief inverse 
coefficient matrix, L. 1A)(IL −−= , where I is the identity matrix and A is the input coefficient 
matrix whose (k, j)th entry is kja , which is the amount of input sourced from industry k directly 
used to produce one dollar’s worth of industry j’s output. 
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(measured in terms of standard deviation), which is computed from the IPUMS 
American Community Survey (ACS) 2008–2012 5-year sample, is used following 
Bombardini et al. (2012).20 Higher residual wage dispersion (i.e., lower residual wage 
dispersion ranking) stands for lower complementarity and thus lower need for 
coordination of the industry. As Bombardini et al. (2012) explain, marginal product of, 
and thus wage return to, unobserved skill is higher in industries with lower skill 
complementarity. Thus, the residual wage dispersion after purging the effect of 
individual characteristics (such as education, age, gender, and race) becomes greater as 
the industry’s skill complementarity becomes lower. More details on the construction of 
jIndCoord2  are provided in Appendix A.  
jIndCoord2  has an advantage over jcIndCoord1  in that more detailed 
industry classifications are available (71 industries compared with 34 industries in the 
case of jcIndCoord1 ).
21  The disadvantage of jIndCoord2  is that it loses 
cross-country variation. Figure 4.3 plots jcIndCoord1  and jIndCoord2  constructed 
based on the same 34 industries as jcIndCoord1 . This shows that both indices are 
highly positively correlated (the correlation coefficient is 0.548 and significant at 1% 
level), reinforcing the validity of using both indices as the measure for industry’s 
coordination needs.   
Table 4.1 arranges 34 industries in ascending order of jcIndCoord1  averaged 
across countries. It also reports the 34-industry-based jIndCoord2 .
22 This reveals that 
manufacturing industries are characterized by a greater need for coordination compared 
with service industries. In terms of jIndCoord2 , several service industries (e.g., post 
20 Similar to Bombardini et al. (2012), I also experiment with the 95-5 interpercentile range 
(instead of standard deviation) as the wage dispersion measure, and obtain similar estimation 
results because both measures are highly correlated.  
21 Seventy-one industries are created by matching the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 4 industry code in 
PIAAC and the INDNAICS code in ACS. 
22 jIndCoord2  based on 71-industry classification is reported in Appendix Table A3. 
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and telecommunications; electricity, gas and water supply; education; transport and 
storage; and computer-related services) record a higher need for coordination than 
manufacturing industries (e.g., other manufacturing; pulp and paper; food, beverage and 
tobacco; textile, apparel and leather; and computer, electronic, and optical equipment).  
Higher coordination needs in many manufacturing industries compared with 
service industries are consistent with intuition, considering the nature of producing a 
manufactured good, which generally requires more sequential production stages. For 
example, a delay in parts production in the previous stages results in more idling time 
(lower productivity) of workers in the later production stages. Thus, coordination 
between sequential production stages is essential. By contrast, in case of services, such 
as selling a financial product, the sales talk of each worker is usually not sequential, but 
rather simultaneous and does not affect the productivity of other workers in general, 
although certain processes (e.g., R&D and marketing before selling products) are 
sequential, similar to manufacturing.   
 
4.2.3 SocK: Social Capital Standing for Workers’ Self-Centeredness 
Table 4.2 lists the social capital variables used in the regression analysis. They 
are constructed from either PIAAC or the World Values Survey and European Values 
Study data (WVS-EVS). All social capital values are region-average figures for 
non-managerial workers. 23  The use of WVS-EVS data can mitigate a possible 
simultaneity bias arising from constructing both Decent and SocK from the same 
PIAAC data. WVS-EVS is an international survey whose main focus is to collect 
people’s various values/attitudes toward family, work, gender, religion, politics, society, 
23 When using PIAAC, samples are non-managerial and non-supervisory workers who are 
working at the lowest level of the firm’s hierarchy and thus the same as the regression sample. 
When using WVS-EVS, samples are based on workers, not self-employed, and having an 
occupation of either non-manual office worker, foreman and supervisor, or manual worker. For 
both PIAAC and WVS-EVS data, regions that have less than 30 observations to calculate the 
region-average social capital are excluded from the sample.  
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and so on. Similarly to Bloom et al. (2012), I combine multiple survey waves (between 
1989 and 2011) and calculate a simple average SocK for each region over all available 
years to increase the sample size.24 This strategy is reasonable given the long-lasting 
nature of people’s values (Bisin and Verdier 2011).  
I use six social capital variables (Table 4.2): three trust-related variables 
(Trust1_piaac, Trust1_wvs, Trust2_piaac);25 two altruism-related variables, which are 
measured by the participation in voluntary work (Vol_piaac, Vol_wvs); and attitude on 
wealth accumulation (Wealth_wvs). These variables are chosen because they are 
considered to serve as proxies for the level of self-centeredness of the average worker 
in the region and also because they cover a sufficient number of countries and 
observations to calculate the region-level figure. Note that higher social capital means 
lower self-centeredness. 
Similar to the argument by Bloom et al. (2012), trust (in particular, 
Trust1_piaac, Trust1_wvs) captures the belief of workers in the region that other 
workers do not do “wrong” actions (e.g., rent-seeking behaviors). Then, higher level of 
trust indicates the lower possibility of rent-seeking behaviors, i.e., the more aligned 
interests between the HQ and workers (= lower λ  in the model in Section 2).    
Alternative reasoning is possible in particular for Trust2_piaac. Consider a 
society in which people think that if they are not careful, others will take advantage of 
them. In such a society, it is likely that workers become self-centered; that is, put less 
weight on others’ performances (large λ ). This is because caring about others’ 
24 To reduce the difference in timing of measuring social capital across regions, the first-wave 
surveys (1981–1984) are excluded. In addition, since data on decentralization was collected in 
2011–2012, part of the sixth-wave surveys (2010–2014) that were conducted before 2012 is 
also excluded. 
25 Trust1_wvs is the most popular trust variable used in literature that examines the effect of trust 
on economic outcome (Bloom et al. 2012; Algan and Cahuc 2014; Cingano and Pinotti 2016). 
WVS-EVS also contains a similar question as Trust2_piaac, which is not used because of 
limited country-coverage.  
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performances leads to more communication, but it is believed that the shared 
information is likely to be exploited by others and harms the worker.  
It is rather straightforward that the level of altruism (measured by the degree of 
voluntary activities) proxies the degree of self-centeredness. The more altruistic 
workers are, the more they care about others’ activities and are eager to help others to 
perform better. 
Finally, Wealth_wvs measures how workers place their views on a 10-point 
scale ranging from 1 (people can only get rich at the expense of others) to 10 (wealth 
can grow, so there’s enough for everyone). The lower Wealth_wvs, the more difficult it 
is for the workers to care about others’ performance, which is believed to result in 
higher rewards to others at their own expense. For this reason, Wealth_wvs is 
considered to proxy the degree of self-centeredness of workers.  
Appendix Table A4 displays the correlations among the six social capital 
variables. All pairwise correlations are positive. The three trust-related variables are 
highly and positively correlated. Next, Table 4.3 arranges countries in ascending order 
of the average level of each social capital variable. It shows that former communist 
countries and France tend to score low, while Northern European countries and Canada 
tend to score high.  
Finally, summary statistics of all the dependent and independent variables 
based on regression samples are reported in the Appendix Table A1. 
 
 
5. Results I: Benefits of Decentralization 
Before examining the effects of an industry’s need for coordination and 
workers’ self-centeredness on decentralization, this section briefly examines whether 
some of the benefits of decentralization mentioned in the Introduction are actually 
observed in PIAAC data. Using the non-managerial and non-supervisory workers’ 
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sample taken from PIAAC, a variable representing the potential benefit of 
decentralization (Benefit) is regressed on the degree of decentralization (Decent) and 
other control variables, similar to those in equation (3.1).26  
As mentioned in the Introduction, greater decentralization is expected to 
accompany productivity improvement owing to the increased job 
satisfaction/motivation of workers. This benefit is captured by worker’s job satisfaction 
(Satisfied) and hourly wage (Wage). I assume that a worker’s hourly wages proxy their 
productivity after controlling for region-specific wage-setting institutions by region 
dummies. Through a laboratory experiment, Bartling et al. (2012) find that offering 
higher discretion to a worker results in higher productivity and profits, provided she 
receives higher wages. Then, the expected positive association between wages and 
delegation may not be causal, but is likely to indicate higher productivity.  
Delegation to workers is also expected to increase the demand for skills 
because the return to delegation is higher when workers have higher ability to manage 
their delegated tasks (Bloom and Van Reenen 2011: 1755). Then, decentralized firms 
would provide more training to their workers (Train), bear a larger amount of its costs 
(Train_wh, Train_cost), and demand more educated and experienced workers 
(Edu_demand, Edu_higherD, Exp_demand). Skill upgrading of workers also may not be 
necessarily causal, but a complement to decentralization in the sense that 
simultaneously introducing both would be profitable to firms.  
The details and summary statistics of the eight Benefit variables are displayed 
in Table 5.1. Table 5.2 reports the estimated coefficients of Decent obtained in the 
Benefit regressions. The estimation method depends on the type of Benefit variables: 
least squares for Wage, probit for Train, and ordered probit for other Benefit variables. 
The degree of decentralization to workers are positively and statistically significantly 
26 As for the control variables, see the notes of Table 5.2.  
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associated with all the Benefit variables, except Train_cost, even after controlling for 
various individual characteristics including multiple dimensions of skills (e.g., 
education, age [or experience and tenure], literacy and numeracy proficiency scores) 
and dummies for industry and country (or region in Wage regression).27 The obtained 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that more delegation to non-managerial and 
non-supervisory workers leads to (or is a complement to) higher job satisfaction and 
wages that proxy higher productivity, and skill upgrading through training and hiring.  
 
 
6. Results II: Determinants of Decentralization 
6.1 Need for Coordination and Self-centeredness: Baseline Results 
Despite the benefits of decentralization, delegation to workers would be limited 
if the costs of delegation (misaligned interests owing to self-centeredness of workers 
and coordination failure) is sufficiently large. Thus, this section examines the effects of 
the self-centeredness of workers and industry’s need for coordination on the degree of 
delegation to workers.  
First, Figure 6.1 plots Decent1 and IndCoord1 (both of which are weighted 
averages of country× industry cell) by the level of country-average Trust1_piaac. The 
left and right plots are based on (nine) countries with low and high average 
Trust1_piaac, respectively. The similar plots based on other SocK variables are 
displayed in the Appendix Figure A3. As expected, regardless of the SocK variables, the 
degree of delegation is negatively associated with both self-centeredness of workers and 
industry’s need for coordination. Although not displayed, a similar tendency is observed 
for Decent2.  
27 The positive associations of job satisfaction and wages with delegation to non-managerial 
workers are consistent with Appelbaum et al. (2000) who find similar correlations by using 
worker survey data in three US manufacturing industries. 
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Figure 6.1 does not control for the effects of individual, workplace, industry, or 
location characteristics on decentralization. As a next step, Table 6.1 reports the 
estimation results for equation (3.1) in the case of using IndCoord1, which controls for 
these various characteristics. It only reports the estimated coefficients on IndCoord1, 
SocK, and IndCoord1*SocK. All specifications control for industry dummies. Columns 
(1)–(3) control for country dummies and column (4) controls for region dummies, and 
thus, the coefficient on region-specific SocK is not identified. As for the difference in 
other control variables and their estimated coefficients, see the notes of Table 6.1 and 
Table 6.2.  
Table 6.1 shows that, regardless of SocK and Decent variables and 
specifications, the coefficient on IndCoord1 is always significantly negative, indicating 
that a greater need for coordination is associated with less delegation to workers. The 
coefficient on SocK tends to be positive in column (1). However, it turns out to be either 
insignificant or negative after adding the interaction term IndCoord1*SocK (columns 2–
4). The coefficient on IndCoord1*SocK is always significantly positive, implying that, 
as the degree of self-centeredness decreases (i.e., as the SocK increases), the negative 
impact of the need for coordination on decentralization is mitigated. The size of 
coefficients is similar regardless of whether country or region dummies are controlled 
for and whether Decent1 or Decent2 is used as the dependent variable. 
These results are mostly consistent with the predictions presented in Section 3. 
At first sight, the insignificant or negative coefficients on SocK in columns (2)–(4) seem 
at odds. However, the minimum value for IndCoord1 is not zero, but one. Furthermore, 
the null hypothesis, 0ˆˆ 32 =+ ββ  (where 2βˆ  and 3βˆ  are coefficients of SocK and 
IndCoord1*SocK, respectively) is not rejected, even at a 10% significance level, except 
in one case (column (3) when using Decent2 and Trust2_piaac). Consequently, the 
estimation results are actually consistent with all predictions (i)–(iv) in Section 3, as 
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Figure 6.2 illustrates.28 Using the estimated coefficients in column (3) of Table 6.1, 
Figure 6.2 plots predicted Decent1 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1� ) and IndCoord1, separately by the 
minimum, mean, and maximum values of SocK in the regression sample. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1�  is 
predicted based solely on IndCoord1 and SocK (=
SocK*IndCoord1SocKIndCoord1 321 ˆˆˆ βββ ++ ). Similar pictures are observed when 
plotting predicted values of Decent2. These graphs generally confirm the predictions: (i) 
higher need for coordination is negatively associated with decentralization in general; 
(ii) lower self-centeredness (i.e., higher SocK) is positively associated with 
decentralization in general; (iii) the negative association between coordination needs 
and decentralization is mitigated as the level of self-centeredness becomes lower; and 
(iv) when coordination needs are very low, the degree of decentralization is almost the 
same, regardless of the level of self-centeredness. Note that if we set 0ˆˆ 32 =+ ββ , then 
all three lines start from the same level of Decent1 when IndCoord1 = 1.0. Furthermore, 
when the level of self-centeredness is very low, the degree of delegation does not 
depend on the coordination needs. This can be seen from the nearly flat graph line of 
Decent1 when the maximum SocK is used, except the case using Vol_piaac.  
 
6.2 Other Determinants of Decentralization 
Table 6.2 reports the estimation results for columns (3) and (4) in Table 6.1 
including other control variables and using Decent1 as the dependent variable. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, assessing the associations between individual 
characteristics and delegation is one of the unique features of this paper.  
28 When IndCoord1 is one (very low) and 0ˆˆ 32 =+ ββ , the degree of decentralization is not 
associated with the level of SocK as expected in prediction (iv). However, as IndCoord1 becomes 
higher, the coefficient on SocK, that is, )Iˆˆ( 32 ndCoord1ββ + , departs from zero and becomes 
larger. In other words, SocK is positively associated with decentralization when IndCoord1 is 
not very low. 
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Individual (and partly workplace) characteristics that are positively and 
significantly associated with the degree of delegation are: years of experience, years of 
education, health status, frequency of skill use in the workplace in terms of ICT, reading, 
writing, and numeracy skills, having an indefinite employment contract, and working in 
a non-profit organization (compared with a private organization). By contrast, being a 
female, born abroad, speaking a foreign native language, working as either a clerk, 
service/sales worker, craft worker, or operator/assembler (compared with elementary 
occupation), working fulltime (i.e., working more than 30 hours per week), working in a 
larger-size establishment, in a workplace that belongs to a larger firm, in the public 
sector, are negatively associated with delegation. Similar tendencies are found when 
using Decent2 (Appendix Table A5). In the case of Decent2, however, age, tenure, and 
numeracy skills are also positively associated with the degree of delegation in most 
specifications while the coefficients on craft occupation and fulltime dummy are not 
statistically significant.  
Positive associations between worker’s skill (education, experience, tenure, 
numeracy skill, and frequency of skill use) and decentralization are consistent with 
firm- or establishment-level studies, such as Bloom et al. (2012) and Bresnahan et al. 
(2002). The positive coefficient on ICT skill use in the workplace is also consistent with 
findings in previous studies (Bresnahan et al. 2002; Colombo and Delmastro 2004; 
McElheran 2014). 
Compared with these results, more delegation to workers with elementary 
occupations, and less delegation to those working fulltime, belonging to a larger 
establishment or firm initially seems surprising. However, it is less surprising if workers 
with elementary occupations enjoy greater autonomy over their own work, given that 
these occupations include cleaners; laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing, and 
transport; street vendors; and so on. It is also natural that part-time workers have more 
flexibility over working hours and the way they work. Finally, as for the 
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establishment/firm size, most studies find that it is positively associated with 
decentralization (Colombo and Delmastro 2004; Bloom et al. 2012; Graham et al. 2015; 
Cingano and Pinotti 2016), although a few studies find an insignificant or negative 
association (McElheran 2014; Meagher and Wait 2014). The current paper differs from 
these past studies in that I examine the delegation to workers at the lowest level of 
organization, whereas past studies mostly examine delegation to managers. The number 
of hierarchic levels between HQ and managers is almost identical, regardless of 
organization size, whereas that between HQ and workers at the lowest level increases 
with organization size. Thus, it is natural that, in a smaller organization, where the 
number of hierarchic levels is also smaller, the lowest-level workers are required to 
share greater authority.  
As for the industry characteristics, working in industries with higher export 
ratios is negatively associated with delegation, whereas the coefficient on import ratio is 
mostly insignificant (Table 6.2, Appendix Table A5).29 These results are different from 
several empirical studies that find positive association between product market 
competition and decentralization (Bloom et al. 2010; Guadalupe and Wulf 2010; 
Meagher and Wait 2014), although the results on the effect of import competition are 
mixed in these studies too. From a theoretical point of view, negative association 
between competition and decentralization is possible (Alonso et al. 2015): Competition 
could favor centralization if the principal has better knowledge about other markets (e.g., 
global markets) than the agent and thus holds an advantage in coordinating adaptation 
to multiple markets (Alonso et al. 2015). 
 
6.3 Additional Results on Need for Coordination and Self-centeredness 
I also estimate equation (3.1) using the 71-industry-based IndCoord2 instead of 
29 It should be noted that the effects of industry characteristics that are common across countries 
are absorbed by the industry dummies. 
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the 34-industry based IndCoord1. The estimation results are reported in Table 6.3. The 
column numbers (2–4) indicate that the specification is the same as the corresponding 
column number in Table 6.1, except that the IndCoord2 coefficient is unidentified and 
that export and import ratios of the industry are not controlled, owing to data 
unavailability. IndCoord2 is industry-specific and common across countries, and thus, 
industry dummies absorb its effect. The results are mostly similar to those when using 
IndCoord1. The coefficient of SocK is mostly insignificant and that of IndCoord2*SocK 
is always significantly positive.  
The analysis so far mitigates the possible endogeneity bias by controlling for 
various individual and workplace characteristics, including multiple ability-related 
measures and industry-specific and country/region-specific factors. It is also reasonable 
to consider the industry-level need for coordination (in particular, IndCoord2, which is 
taken from US data) exogenous for the firm’s HQ that chooses the optimal degree of 
delegation. Region-level social capital (in particular, the one taken from the different 
source [WVS-EVS]), which is likely to be slow changing, is also considered almost 
exogenous for the firm. However, reverse causality from decentralization to social 
capital might still be possible. For example, Appelbaum et al. (2000, Chapter 9) argue 
that workers’ greater opportunity to participate in decision making leads to their higher 
trust of managers.  
To deal with such potential reverse causality, SocK is instrumented with the 
country-specific ethnic segregation index (Segregation) constructed by Alesina and 
Zhuravskaya (2011). 30 Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) find that more segregated 
30 More precisely, SocK is instrumented with [1-Segregation] to generate positive association 
between SocK and Segregation, because Segregation ranges from 0 to 1 and becomes larger 
when the country is more segregated. Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) also construct linguistic 
and religious segregation indices, but these are not used due to their limited country coverage. It 
should be noted that, among countries included in the estimation sample in Tables 6.1–6.3, 
ethnic segregation index is not available for Poland.  
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countries, where ethnic groups live more spatially separately, have lower levels of trust. 
Then, the decentralization measure is regressed on IndCoord2*SocK, industry and 
region dummies, and other control variables (Control 1’ or Control 3’ in Table 6.3) by 
the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. The results are reported in Table 6.4. Note 
that, owing to the inclusion of industry and region dummies, 1βˆ and 2βˆ  are not 
identified. First, the instrument (IndCoord2*[1-Segregation]) is strongly correlated with 
IndCoord2*SocK in all specifications, except when using Trust1_piaac as SocK. This is 
shown by the F statistic in the first stage regression, which is substantially larger than 
10 (the rule of thumb by Staiger and Stock [1997]) or 16.38 (Stock and Yogo [2005]’s 
critical values with the 10% maximal size of Wald test) in all specifications except the 
Trust1_piaac case. Next, the results of the endogeneity test show that the null 
hypothesis that SocK is exogenous is not rejected in all specifications at 5% (or 1% in 
most cases) significance level. These results indicate that the results obtained in Tables 
6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 are robust.   
 
 
7. Conclusion 
Despite the various benefits of delegation to workers, the actual degree of 
delegation substantially varies across countries/regions and industries. As an important 
reason for such variation, this paper focuses on the differences in two types of 
delegation costs: (1) region-specific social capital that proxies workers’ degree of 
self-centeredness and (2) industry-specific need for coordination. Based on the 
theoretical framework by Alonso et al. (2008), I have empirically examined the effect of 
these two cost measures on the degree of delegation to non-managerial and 
non-supervisory workers utilizing worker-level PIAAC data from 14 countries.  
The empirical results of this study have confirmed the theoretical predictions 
by Alonso et al. (2008) for the first time: The negative association between coordination 
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needs and decentralization is mitigated in regions with lower self-centeredness of 
workers. In particular, when self-centeredness of workers (respectively, coordination 
need) is very low, the degree of delegation is very high and generally does not depend 
on the level of coordination needs (self-centeredness of workers). These results are 
robust to alternative indices for delegation, an industry’s coordination needs, and 
self-centeredness of workers. The possibility of endogeneity bias is minimized by 
controlling for various individual and workplace characteristics, and industry and 
country/region dummies, by constructing social capital and coordination needs indices 
from other sources, and by conducting endogeneity tests for social capital variables.  
I also have found that delegation is positively associated with its potential 
benefits, such as higher job satisfaction, higher wages (proxy for higher productivity), 
more training, and increased demand for skills. These benefits are beneficial not only 
for firms, but also for the welfare of workers and a country’s economic development. 
The identified positive associations are consistent with the theoretical predictions that 
delegation brings such effects. My empirical results are not necessarily causal and may 
partly reflect the complementarities among decentralization and these “benefits.” 
However, even in the complementary case, it is highly likely that social capital and 
coordination needs affect firms’ joint decisions on the levels of delegation, wages, and 
skill upgrading.  
This study has important implications for the economic development patterns 
of regions or countries. As summarized above, this study has shown that the degree of 
delegation to workers becomes high in regions in which workers’ self-centeredness is 
low, even when the industry’s coordination needs are extremely high. These industries 
requiring greater coordination are those that need to combine greater amounts of 
intermediate inputs (or require a greater number of production stages) and substantially 
suffer from a poor performance in production processes. Many manufacturing industries, 
in particular, transport equipment, basic metals, and various machinery manufacturing, 
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fall into this type. These tendencies are generally observed, regardless of country.31 
Then, the results of this paper imply that non-managerial and non-supervisory workers 
in these manufacturing industries are delegated more authority, are more satisfied, 
receive higher wages and more training, and achieve higher productivity in 
regions/countries in which self-centeredness of workers is lower. Thus, by changing the 
level of delegation and its “benefits,” social capital representing self-centeredness may 
affect not only economic growth, but also the comparative advantage of regions or 
countries. In addition, higher wages and higher skill demand for non-managerial and 
non-supervisory positions may lead to less inequality in terms of both income and skill.  
These possible links between social capital, delegation, and comparative 
advantage and inequalities of regions/countries are interesting areas for future empirical 
investigation. Examining whether greater delegation in the case of very low 
self-centeredness and very high coordination needs are actually due to improved 
horizontal communication and coordination among workers as modeled by Alonso et al. 
(2008) is also left for future research, as data for horizontal and vertical communication 
were not available for this study. 
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Figure 1.1. Average Scores for Countries’ Degree of Worker Discretion on the Way of Work 
Notes: The scores are the country-average, computed from the PIAAC’s question that asks to what 
extent (5-point scale) the respondent can choose or change how she does her work: 1 = not at all; 2 = 
very little; 3 = to some extent; 4 = to a high extent; and 5 = to a very high extent. PIAAC’s sampling 
weight is used to calculate the average. The sample workers are non-managerial and non-supervisory 
workers who are examined throughout this paper. They are paid employees (excluding self-employed) 
and neither skilled agricultural/fishery workers nor military personnel, and have no employees to 
supervise or manage either directly or indirectly. 
Source: Public Use Files (PUF) of the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies (PIAAC), generated by OECD. 
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Figure 1.2. Average Scores of Industries’ Degree of Worker Discretion on the Way of Work 
 
  
Notes: See Figure 1.1. Industry average is computed based on non-managerial and non-supervisory 
workers in all countries where the 2-digit level industry code based on ISIC Rev. 4 are available. 
Industry code number is in parentheses. For industry classification, see Appendix Table 1. 
Source: See Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 4.1. Average Scores of Countries’ Decentralization Index: Decent1 
Note: For the definition of Decent1, see Section 4.2.1. 
 
  
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Russia
Italy
Slovak Republic
South Korea
Ireland
France
Spain
Poland
UK
Netherlands
Canada
US
Estonia
Czech Republic
Belgium
Germany
Norway
Austria
Japan
Sweden
Denmark
Finland
Decent1
 37 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Average Score of Industries’ Decentralization Index: Decent1 
Notes: For the definition of Decent1, see Section 4.2.1. Industry code number is in parentheses. For 
industry classification, see Appendix Table 1. 
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Figure 4.3. Correlation between IndCood1 and IndCoord2  
Note: For the definitions of IndCoord1 and IndCoord2 (which is based on 34 industries), see Section 
4.2.2.  
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Figure 6.1. Decentralization (Decent1) and Need for Coordination (IndCoord1)  
by Level of Workers’ Self-centeredness (Trust1_piaac) 
 
Notes: Each data point plots the weighted average Decent1 and IndCoord1 of the cell defined by 
country and industry (PIAAC’s sampling weight is used). Cells with fewer than 30 observations are 
excluded from the sample. The left and right plots are based on nine countries with low and high 
average Trust1_piaac, (i.e., high and low average self-centeredness of workers, respectively). The 
countries with low (respectively, high) Trust1_piaac include the top (bottom) nine countries (among 
non-italic countries that have IndCoord1 data) in the column “Trust1_piaac” in Table 4.3. For the 
definition of variables, see Section 4.2.  
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Figure 6.2. Predicted Decent1 and IndCoord1 by Level of SocK 
Notes: The above graphs plot Decent1 that is predicted based solely on IndCoord1 and SocK (=
SocK*IndCoord1SocKIndCoord1 321 ˆˆˆ βββ ++ ) and IndCoord1 separately by the minimum, 
mean, and maximum values of SocK in the regression sample. The minimum and maximum of 
IndCoord1 in the regression sample are 1.000 and 4.111, respectively. 1βˆ , 2βˆ , 3βˆ  are taken from 
column (3) of Table 6.1. For the definitions of variables, see Section 4.2.  
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Table 4.1. Industry Need for Coordination: Sorted by IndCoord1  
Code Sector Industry Description IndCoord1 IndCoord2 
34 S  Private households with employed persons 1.000 NA 
31 S  Education 1.469 21 
26 S  Real estate 1.641 1 
32 S  Health and social work 1.675 11 
30 S  Public administration and defence, compulsory social security 1.707 NA 
25 S  Financial intermediation 1.832 7 
28 S  Computer and related services 1.908 16 
29 S  R&D and other business services 1.926 3 
2 P  Mining and quarrying 1.960 8 
27 S  Renting of machinery and equipment 1.986 4 
21 S  Wholesale and retail trade, repair services 1.993 5 
33 S  Other community, social and personal services 1.995 2 
24 S  Post and telecommunications 2.078 29 
22 S  Hotels and restaurants 2.193 6 
1 P  Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 2.337 28 
19 (S)  Electricity, gas and water supply 2.391 27 
23 S  Transport and storage 2.412 18 
20 (S)  Construction 2.435 12 
6 M  Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 2.524 10 
10 M  Other non-metallic mineral products 2.575 24 
12 M  Fabricated metal products 2.655 22 
5 M  Wood and products of wood and cork 2.663 20 
4 M  Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 2.688 14 
18 M  Manufacturing nec, recycling 2.702 9 
13 M  Machinery and equipment, nec 2.745 31 
8 M  Chemicals and chemical products 2.753 19 
3 M  Food products, beverages and tobacco 2.786 13 
17 M  Other transport equipment 2.786 32 
9 M  Rubber and plastics products 2.815 25 
7 M  Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 2.876 17 
14 M  Computer, Electronic and optical equipment 2.880 15 
15 M  Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 2.911 26 
11 M  Basic metals 3.180 30 
16 M  Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 3.365 23 
Notes: Figures are weighted average scores across 18 countries with 2-digit level industry codes (ISIC 
Rev. 4). For the definitions of IndCoord1 and IndCoord2 (based on 34 industries), see Section 4.2.2. P, 
M, and S in the column “Sector” denote primary, manufacturing, and service sectors, respectively. 
Electricity, gas, and water supply and construction are generally included in the “Industry” sector, but 
can be broadly interpreted as service sector.  
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Table 4.2. Description of Social Capital (Workers’ Self-centeredness) Variables 
Variable Source Question Description 
Trust1_piaac PIAAC I_Q07a 
There are only a few people you can trust completely.  
(5-point scale: 1 = strongly agree–5 = strongly disagree) 
Trust1_wvs 
WVS-EVS 
(2-6 
waves) 
A165 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? 
(0 = need to be very careful, 1 = most people can be trusted)  
Trust2_piaac PIAAC I_Q07b 
If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you.  
(5-point scale: 1 = strongly agree–5 = strongly disagree) 
Vol_piaac PIAAC I_Q05f 
In the last 12 months, how often, if at all, did you do voluntary work, 
including unpaid work for a charity, political party, trade union or 
other non-profit organisation?  
(5-point scale: 1 = never–5 = every day) 
Vol_wvs 
WVS-EVS 
(3, 5, 6 
waves) 
A105 
Membership status of charitable/humanitarian organization  
(3-point scale: 0 = not a member, =: inactive member, 2 = active 
member) 
Wealth_wvs 
WVS-EVS 
(2,3,5,6 
waves) 
E041 
Attitude on wealth accumulation  
(10-point scale: 1 = people can only get rich at the expense of others–
10 = wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone) 
Notes: See also Section 4.2.3.  
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Table 4.3. Countries’ Average Social Capital (Workers’ Self-centeredness)  
Trust1_piaac Trust1_wvs Trust2_piaac Vol_piaac Vol_wvs Wealth_wvs 
FRA 1.804  FRA 0.214  ITA 1.826  RUS 1.212  EST 0.018  RUS 4.767 
ITA 1.879  SVK 0.218  SVK 1.888  POL 1.231  JPN 0.041  SVK 5.611 
SVK 1.936  EST 0.227  CZE 1.932  SVK 1.274  CZE 0.044  ESP 5.731 
EST 1.951  RUS 0.233  POL 1.945  CZE 1.295  SVK 0.048  IRL 5.789 
CZE 1.953  CZE 0.257  US 1.960  ESP 1.314  RUS 0.071  CZE 5.809 
AUT 2.104  POL 0.265  FRA 1.984  EST 1.320  POL 0.165  FRA 5.882 
IRL 2.116  KOR 0.299  EST 2.041  KOR 1.322  ESP 0.167  UK 6.008 
DEU 2.143  ITA 0.321  DEU 2.046  ITA 1.348  DEU 0.179  SWE 6.012 
BEL 2.170  UK 0.332  AUT 2.051  JPN 1.410  NLD 0.207  JPN 6.068 
UK 2.176  DEU 0.356  RUS 2.079  FRA 1.444  ITA 0.215  NLD 6.174 
POL 2.178  US 0.358  IRL 2.084  UK 1.450  FIN 0.228  US 6.226 
US 2.178  ESP 0.363  KOR 2.103  BEL 1.566  FRA 0.266  FIN 6.302 
KOR 2.197  AUT 0.371  UK 2.106  AUT 1.596  KOR 0.338  DNK 6.309 
ESP 2.208  IRL 0.402  ESP 2.126  SWE 1.599  SWE 0.354  NOR 6.356 
JPN 2.209  BEL 0.404  CAN 2.210  IRL 1.637  NOR 0.370  BEL 6.581 
RUS 2.261  CAN 0.413  BEL 2.257  DEU 1.656  CAN 0.511  DEU 6.612 
CAN 2.355  JPN 0.413  NLD 2.516  FIN 1.685  US 0.530  ITA 6.651 
NOR 2.543  FIN 0.547  NOR 2.564  NLD 1.727  
  
CAN 6.733 
FIN 2.548  NLD 0.553  DNK 2.809  CAN 1.766  
  
KOR 6.778 
NLD 2.580  NOR 0.677  FIN 2.964  DNK 1.767  
  
AUT 7.095 
SWE 2.595  SWE 0.683  JPN 2.996  US 1.884  
  
POL 7.314 
DNK 2.870  DNK 0.693  SWE 3.017  NOR 1.897      EST 7.432 
Notes: For each social capital variable, the self-centeredness of average workers becomes lower 
moving down the table. Countries highlighted in gray are those not used in the regression analysis 
owing to lack of region information. Figures for Trust1_piaac, Trust2_piaac, and Vol_piaac are 
computed using PIAAC’s sampling weight. For the definitions of social capital variables, see Table 4.2 
and Section 4.2.3. As for country code, see Appendix Table A1 and the following definitions: AUT: 
Austria, BEL: Belgium, CAN: Canada, EST: Estonia, FIN: Finland, ITA: Italy, NOR: Norway, US: 
United States. 
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Table 5.1. Variables Standing for Potential Benefits of Decentralization  
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
Satisfied 
All things considered, how satisfied the respondent is with her 
current job (5-point scale: 1 = extremely dissatisfied–5: 
extremely satisfied) 
3.892 0.870 31273 
Wage Log of hourly earnings including bonuses for wage and salary earners, PPP corrected USD (constructed by PIAAC) 2.445 0.723 27260 
Train 
Dummy:1 if participated in any one of the following learning 
activities during the last 12 months: 1) open or distance 
education, 2) organized sessions for on-the-job training or 
training by supervisors or co-workers, 3) seminars or 
workshops, or 4) courses or private lessons, 0 if not 
participated 
0.433 0.496 30623 
Train_wh 
When the train_2 activity took place (4-point scale: 1 = only 
outside working hours, 2 = mostly outside working hours, 3 = 
mostly during working hours, 4 = only during working hours) 
3.088 1.219 8712 
Train 
_cost 
To what degree the costs (tuition, registration or exam fees, 
expenses for books or other costs) of train_2 were paid by the 
employer or prospective employer (3-point scale: 1 = not at all, 
2 = partly paid, 3 = totally paid) 
2.562 0.795 7743 
Edu 
_demand 
The usual educational qualifications required, if someone 
applies for the respondent's current job (7-point scale: 1 = 
primary or less, 2 = lower secondary, 3 = upper secondary, 4 = 
post-secondary but non-tertiary, 5 = tertiary–professional 
degree, 6 = tertiary–bachelor degree, 7 = tertiary–
master/research degree) 
2.997 1.434 30702 
Edu 
_higherD 
3-point scale: 1 if edu7_demand is higher than the 
respondent’s own education level, 0 if the same, and −1 if 
lower 
-0.218 0.663 30906 
Exp 
_demand 
How much related work experience required, if some applies 
for the respondent's current job (6-point scale: 1 = none, 2 = 
less than 1 month, 3 = 1–6 months, 4 = 7–11 months, 5 = 1 or 
2 years, 6 = 3 years or more) 
3.075 1.797 30904 
Notes: Summary statistics are computed based on the regression sample of column (1) in Table 5.2 
when using Decent1. Both mean and standard deviations are computed using the “repest” command in 
Stata (with the revised weight).  
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Table 5.2. Potential Benefits and Decentralization 
Notes: The coefficient (coef.) stands for the estimated coefficient on Decent, when regressing the 
Benefit variable on Decent and other control variables. Standard errors (se.) in parentheses are 
estimated using jackknife replicate weights with the “repest” command (weight is revised as explained 
in Section 3). In addition to the Decent variable, column (1) controls for gender, age and its square, 
years of education, literacy and numeracy skills (proficiency scores), health status, foreign-born status, 
occupation dummies, skills used at work (reading, writing, numeracy, and ICT), fulltime-work dummy, 
employment size of the workplace, and public and non-profit organization sector dummies, export and 
import ratios of the industry, industry and country dummies. As for Train_wh and Train_cost 
regressions, dummies for the content of the training programs are also controlled for. In addition to 
these variables, column (2) controls for dummies for foreign language and indefinite employment 
contract. The control variables in column (3) are almost the same in column (2) except (i) that instead 
of age and its square, years of work experience and its square, and years of tenure at the current 
employer and its square are controlled for; (ii) that only in Wage regression are region dummies 
controlled for instead of country dummies; and (iii) that only in Satisfied regression is Wage is 
additionally controlled. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
Decent =
Dep. Var. (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
coef. 0.185 *** 0.191 *** 0.190 *** 0.209 *** 0.208 *** 0.207 ***
se. (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
obs. 31273 29066 26316 31142 28956 26234
coef. 0.036 *** 0.032 *** 0.029 *** 0.050 *** 0.041 *** 0.040 ***
se. (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
obs. 27260 26402 22286 27162 26319 22208
coef. 0.045 *** 0.036 ** 0.033 ** 0.081 *** 0.068 *** 0.065 ***
se. (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
obs. 30623 28457 28359 30492 28346 28250
coef. 0.065 ** 0.060 ** 0.061 ** 0.063 ** 0.060 * 0.063 **
se. (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
obs. 8712 8104 8096 8687 8082 8074
coef. -0.006 -0.014 -0.019 0.014 0.004 0.001
se. (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048)
obs. 7743 7273 7262 7723 7255 7244
coef. 0.030 ** 0.034 *** 0.031 *** 0.089 *** 0.095 *** 0.092 ***
se. (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
N 30702 28501 28401 30578 28398 28301
obs. 0.037 *** 0.041 *** 0.038 *** 0.094 *** 0.097 *** 0.094 ***
se. (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
obs. 30906 28704 28604 30782 28601 28504
coef. 0.150 *** 0.159 *** 0.155 *** 0.254 *** 0.265 *** 0.262 ***
se. (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
obs. 30904 28710 28610 30786 28613 28516
ordered
probit
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Table 6.1. Decentralization, Coordination Needs (IndCoord1), and Self-centeredness 
Dep. Var. = 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
SocK  = Trust1_piaac
IndCoord1 -0.136 *** -0.412 *** -0.381 *** -0.344 *** -0.092 *** -0.313 *** -0.319 *** -0.296 ***
(0.028) (0.090) (0.090) (0.091) (0.022) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075)
SocK 0.131 ** -0.138 * -0.146 0.111 ** -0.103 -0.130 *
(0.060) (0.083) (0.089) (0.045) (0.068) (0.072)
IndCoord1*SocK 0.127 *** 0.125 *** 0.112 *** 0.102 *** 0.110 *** 0.103 ***
(0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Observations 25475 25475 24650 24549 25351 25351 24544 24446
SocK  = Trust1_wvs
IndCoord1 -0.132 *** -0.191 *** -0.178 *** -0.167 *** -0.090 *** -0.144 *** -0.142 *** -0.134 ***
(0.028) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.022) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
SocK 0.214 ** -0.147 -0.302 0.127 -0.202 -0.294 *
(0.108) (0.186) (0.196) (0.083) (0.150) (0.153)
IndCoord1*SocK 0.167 ** 0.201 *** 0.198 *** 0.152 *** 0.175 *** 0.176 ***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056)
Observations 25253 25253 24458 24356 25135 25135 24352 24253
SocK  = Trust2_piaac
IndCoord1 -0.136 *** -0.312 *** -0.285 *** -0.259 *** -0.093 *** -0.262 *** -0.251 *** -0.232 ***
(0.028) (0.070) (0.072) (0.071) (0.022) (0.060) (0.060) (0.058)
SocK 0.080 -0.093 -0.177 ** 0.056 -0.110 -0.192 ***
(0.071) (0.084) (0.084) (0.055) (0.069) (0.068)
IndCoord1*SocK 0.082 *** 0.082 *** 0.074 *** 0.079 *** 0.079 *** 0.074 ***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Observations 25475 25475 24650 24549 25351 25351 24544 24446
SocK  =Vol_piaac
IndCoord1 -0.137 *** -0.295 *** -0.277 *** -0.275 *** -0.094 *** -0.264 *** -0.249 *** -0.233 ***
(0.028) (0.087) (0.089) (0.089) (0.022) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072)
SocK 0.230 *** -0.015 -0.102 0.151 *** -0.114 -0.143
(0.067) (0.130) (0.129) (0.051) (0.109) (0.106)
IndCoord1*SocK 0.113 * 0.121 ** 0.126 ** 0.122 ** 0.121 ** 0.115 **
(0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047)
Observations 25475 25475 24650 24549 25351 25351 24544 24446
SocK  = Vol_wvs
IndCoord1 -0.136 *** -0.167 *** -0.146 *** -0.139 *** -0.098 *** -0.135 *** -0.127 *** -0.118 ***
(0.034) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.028) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034)
SocK 0.250 ** -0.114 -0.314 0.179 ** -0.258 -0.348 **
(0.116) (0.207) (0.207) (0.079) (0.162) (0.161)
IndCoord1*SocK 0.166 ** 0.222 *** 0.230 *** 0.199 *** 0.230 *** 0.223 ***
(0.077) (0.080) (0.084) (0.063) (0.062) (0.066)
Observations 15265 15265 14487 14431 15183 15183 14417 14362
SocK  = Wealth_wvs
IndCoord1 -0.129 *** -0.257 *** -0.305 *** -0.258 *** -0.096 *** -0.245 *** -0.272 *** -0.228 ***
(0.028) (0.084) (0.089) (0.091) (0.022) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071)
SocK 0.033 * -0.015 -0.069 ** 0.024 * -0.031 -0.059 **
(0.019) (0.032) (0.034) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024)
IndCoord1*SocK 0.021 * 0.033 ** 0.027 ** 0.025 ** 0.031 *** 0.025 **
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 22780 22780 21993 21900 22673 22673 21898 21807
Control vars Control 1 Control 1 Control 2 Control 3 Control 1 Control 1 Control 2 Control 3
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes
Decent2Decent1
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 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using jackknife replicate weights with the “repest” 
command in Stata (weight is revised as explained in Section 3). Control 1 includes gender, age and its 
square, years of education, literacy and numeracy skills (proficiency scores), health status, 
foreign-born status, occupation dummies, skills used at work (reading, writing, numeracy, and ICT), 
fulltime-work dummy, employment size of the workplace, and public and non-profit organization 
sector dummies, and export and import ratios of the industry. Control 2 includes dummies for foreign 
language and indefinite employment contract in addition to Control 1. Control 3 is almost the same as 
Control 2 except that instead of age and its square, years of work experience and its square, and years 
of tenure at the current employer and its square are included. Note that by including Control 2 or 
Control 3, Russian workers are excluded from the regression sample. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 
0.1.  
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Table 6.2. Other Determinants of Decentralization (Decent1) 
SocK =
(3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4)
IndCoord1 -0.381 *** -0.344 *** -0.178 *** -0.167 *** -0.285 *** -0.259 *** -0.277 *** -0.275 *** -0.146 *** -0.139 *** -0.305 *** -0.258 ***
(0.090) (0.091) (0.040) (0.040) (0.072) (0.071) (0.089) (0.089) (0.040) (0.040) (0.089) (0.091)
SocK -0.146 -0.302 -0.177 ** -0.102 -0.314 -0.069 **
(0.089) (0.196) (0.084) (0.129) (0.207) (0.034)
IndCoord1*SocK 0.125 *** 0.112 *** 0.201 *** 0.198 *** 0.082 *** 0.074 *** 0.121 ** 0.126 ** 0.222 *** 0.230 *** 0.033 ** 0.027 **
(0.037) (0.037) (0.066) (0.068) (0.028) (0.028) (0.058) (0.059) (0.080) (0.084) (0.014) (0.014)
Female -0.027 ** -0.025 ** -0.030 ** -0.027 ** -0.028 ** -0.025 ** -0.027 ** -0.025 ** -0.008 -0.007 -0.023 * -0.021 *
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age^2 0.000 * 0.000 * 0.000 * 0.000 * 0.000 * 0.000 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exp 0.003 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 **
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Exp^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Eduy 0.015 *** 0.016 *** 0.015 *** 0.016 *** 0.015 *** 0.016 *** 0.015 *** 0.016 *** 0.017 *** 0.018 *** 0.016 *** 0.017 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
LitSkill 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NumSkill 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 ** 0.001 * 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Health 0.029 *** 0.029 *** 0.028 *** 0.027 *** 0.029 *** 0.029 *** 0.029 *** 0.028 *** 0.035 *** 0.034 *** 0.029 *** 0.028 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Forborn -0.089 *** -0.081 *** -0.090 *** -0.081 *** -0.088 *** -0.081 *** -0.087 *** -0.081 *** -0.082 ** -0.072 ** -0.083 *** -0.073 ***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.035) (0.036) (0.026) (0.027)
Forlang -0.057 * -0.058 * -0.057 * -0.058 * -0.056 * -0.058 * -0.056 * -0.059 * -0.084 ** -0.085 ** -0.068 * -0.068 *
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.040) (0.040) (0.036) (0.036)
Trust1_piaac Trust1_wvs Trust2_piaac Vol_piaac Vol_wvs Wealth_wvs
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SocK =
(3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4)
Occ: Tech/AssoPro 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.016 0.002 0.009 0.003
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020)
Occ: Clerks -0.037 ** -0.042 ** -0.038 ** -0.042 ** -0.036 * -0.042 ** -0.036 ** -0.043 ** -0.024 -0.039 * -0.036 * -0.042 **
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.018)
Occ: Service/Sales -0.073 *** -0.072 *** -0.074 *** -0.075 *** -0.073 *** -0.073 *** -0.074 *** -0.075 *** -0.071 *** -0.079 *** -0.076 *** -0.078 ***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019)
Occ: Craft -0.052 ** -0.061 *** -0.051 ** -0.059 *** -0.053 ** -0.061 *** -0.053 ** -0.061 *** -0.052 * -0.068 ** -0.052 ** -0.063 ***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022)
Occ: Operator -0.215 *** -0.221 *** -0.218 *** -0.224 *** -0.218 *** -0.223 *** -0.218 *** -0.223 *** -0.223 *** -0.237 *** -0.218 *** -0.227 ***
          /Assembler (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
ICTwork 0.149 *** 0.146 *** 0.151 *** 0.148 *** 0.148 *** 0.146 *** 0.150 *** 0.146 *** 0.164 *** 0.162 *** 0.147 *** 0.145 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
ReadWork 0.121 *** 0.117 *** 0.121 *** 0.117 *** 0.122 *** 0.117 *** 0.121 *** 0.117 *** 0.125 *** 0.121 *** 0.124 *** 0.119 ***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014)
WriteWork 0.028 *** 0.026 *** 0.027 *** 0.025 *** 0.028 *** 0.026 *** 0.027 *** 0.026 *** 0.018 0.017 0.023 ** 0.022 **
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
NumWork 0.090 *** 0.090 *** 0.090 *** 0.089 *** 0.090 *** 0.089 *** 0.090 *** 0.090 *** 0.091 *** 0.088 *** 0.093 *** 0.092 ***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Fulltime -0.082 *** -0.086 *** -0.084 *** -0.089 *** -0.082 *** -0.086 *** -0.083 *** -0.087 *** -0.087 *** -0.093 *** -0.084 *** -0.089 ***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Permanent 0.058 *** 0.042 *** 0.056 *** 0.041 *** 0.058 *** 0.042 *** 0.059 *** 0.042 *** 0.053 *** 0.033 ** 0.055 *** 0.040 ***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
Estsize: 11-50 -0.163 *** -0.162 *** -0.163 *** -0.162 *** -0.162 *** -0.162 *** -0.163 *** -0.162 *** -0.167 *** -0.166 *** -0.164 *** -0.162 ***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Estsize: 51-250 -0.171 *** -0.175 *** -0.172 *** -0.175 *** -0.171 *** -0.175 *** -0.170 *** -0.175 *** -0.157 *** -0.161 *** -0.169 *** -0.172 ***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018)
Estsize: 251-1000 -0.178 *** -0.184 *** -0.177 *** -0.182 *** -0.177 *** -0.184 *** -0.177 *** -0.184 *** -0.182 *** -0.187 *** -0.179 *** -0.184 ***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.023) (0.024)
Estsize: 1000+ -0.141 *** -0.146 *** -0.139 *** -0.144 *** -0.139 *** -0.146 *** -0.138 *** -0.147 *** -0.112 *** -0.123 *** -0.142 *** -0.148 ***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.031) (0.026) (0.026)
PartOfFirm -0.043 *** -0.045 *** -0.041 *** -0.043 *** -0.043 *** -0.045 *** -0.044 *** -0.046 *** -0.031 ** -0.033 ** -0.040 *** -0.043 ***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Trust1_piaac Trust1_wvs Trust2_piaac Vol_piaac Vol_wvs Wealth_wvs
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Notes: The dependent variable is Decent1. Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using jackknife replicate weights with the “repest” command in Stata 
(weight is revised as explained in Section 3). The column numbers (3) and (4) indicate that the results are identical to those with the same column numbers in 
Table 6.1. Elementary occupation, establishment size of 1–10, and private sector are the omitted reference groups. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
SocK =
(3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4)
PublicSector -0.056 *** -0.064 *** -0.057 *** -0.064 *** -0.057 *** -0.066 *** -0.058 *** -0.066 *** -0.048 ** -0.059 *** -0.047 ** -0.054 ***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019)
NPOSector 0.064 * 0.060 * 0.060 * 0.055 0.064 * 0.059 * 0.067 * 0.062 * 0.082 ** 0.075 * 0.080 ** 0.075 **
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.040) (0.040) (0.036) (0.036)
IndExpor -0.001 *** -0.002 *** -0.001 ** -0.002 *** -0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.001 *** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.001 * -0.001 **
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IndImpor 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.259 0.263 0.259 0.263 0.259 0.263 0.259 0.263 0.270 0.273 0.262 0.266
Observations 24650 24549 24458 24356 24650 24549 24650 24549 14487 14431 21993 21900
Trust1_piaac Trust1_wvs Trust2_piaac Vol_piaac Vol_wvs Wealth_wvs
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Table 6.3. Decentralization, Coordination Needs (IndCoord2), and Self-centeredness 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using jackknife replicate weights with the “repest” 
command in Stata (weight is revised as explained in Section 3). IndCoord2 is based on 71 industries. 
The coefficient of industry-specific IndCoord2 is not identified because of the presence of industry 
dummies. Control X’ (where X = 1, 2, 3) is Control X in Table 6.1 minus export and import ratios of 
the industry, the data for which are not available. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Dep. Var. = 
(2) (3) (4) (2) (3) (4)
SocK  = Trust1_piaac
SocK 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.005
(0.066) (0.061) (0.047) (0.047)
IndCoord2*SocK 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 23633 22852 22755 23515 22751 22657
SocK  = Trust1_wvs
SocK 0.020 -0.085 -0.062 -0.104
(0.120) (0.126) (0.095) (0.095)
IndCoord2*SocK 0.006 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 23421 22671 22573 23308 22570 22475
SocK  = Trust2_piaac
SocK -0.007 -0.070 -0.026 -0.082 *
(0.074) (0.065) (0.052) (0.050)
IndCoord2*SocK 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 23633 22852 22755 23515 22751 22657
SocK  = Vol_piaac
SocK 0.112 0.051 0.010 -0.018
(0.085) (0.080) (0.059) (0.061)
IndCoord2*SocK 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 23633 22852 22755 23515 22751 22657
SocK  = Vol_wvs
SocK 0.029 -0.056 -0.026 -0.047
(0.137) (0.129) (0.092) (0.093)
IndCoord2*SocK 0.006 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 14162 13428 13375 14084 13362 13310
SocK  = Wealth_wvs
SocK 0.008 -0.029 -0.007 -0.024
(0.022) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019)
IndCoord2*SocK 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 21189 20447 20358 21087 20357 20270
Control vars Control 1' Control 2' Control 3' Control 1' Control 2' Control 3'
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes
Decent1 Decent2
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Table 6.4. Endogeneity Test for Social Capital (Workers’ Self-centeredness) 
Notes: Estimation method is two-stage least squares. IndCoord2*SocK is instrumented with IndCoord2*(1-Segregation), where Segregation is 
country-specific ethnic segregation index constructed by Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011). The endogeneity test statistic stands for the difference of the two 
Sargan–Hansen statistics: one for the equation in which SocK is treated as endogenous and one for the equation in which SocK is treated as exogenous. Under 
the null hypothesis, SocK is exogenous. Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using jackknife replicate weights with the “repest” command in Stata 
(weight is revised as explained in Section 3). For the contents of Control 1’ and Control 3’, see Table 6.3. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
Dep. Var. =
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
SocK  = Trust1_piaac SocK  = Trust1_wvs
IndCoord2*SocK 0.024 0.072 -0.039 -0.046 -0.006 -0.018 0.010 0.014
(0.049) (0.157) (0.044) (0.109) (0.011) (0.034) (0.008) (0.027)
Observations 21024 20182 20915 20092 20952 20140 20848 20050
Endogeneity test stat. 0.193 0.276 1.411 0.239 1.196 0.564 0.280 0.109
   p-value 0.661 0.600 0.235 0.626 0.274 0.453 0.597 0.742
1st stage F stat. 7.934 0.931 7.989 0.944 439.394 45.405 421.458 44.267
SocK  = Trust2_piaac SocK  = Vol_piaac
IndCoord2*SocK -0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.004 0.004 0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006)
Observations 21024 20182 20915 20092 21024 20182 20915 20092
Endogeneity test stat. 1.302 1.042 0.174 0.004 2.047 1.280 0.040 0.150
   p-value 0.254 0.308 0.677 0.953 0.153 0.258 0.843 0.699
1st stage F stat. 477.116 259.714 467.540 257.604 2194.957 869.368 2217.709 868.091
SocK = Vol_wvs SocK = Wealth_wvs
IndCoord2*SocK -0.020 -0.022 0.007 0.005 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.020) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.004)
Observations 14162 14100 14084 14025 19105 18305 19007 18221
Endogeneity test stat. 1.588 1.771 0.009 0.001 3.315 1.179 0.175 0.004
   p-value 0.208 0.184 0.932 0.977 0.069 0.278 0.676 0.953
1st stage F stat. 129.259 129.207 123.072 123.132 1456.048 126.718 1413.115 124.608
Control vars Control 1' Control 3' Control 1' Control 3' Control 1' Control 3' Control 1' Control 3'
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decent1 Decent2 Decent1 Decent2
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Construction of IndCoord2 
As mentioned in Section 4.2.2, jIndCoord2  is the industry-specific skill 
substitutability (or complementarity) index used in Bombardini et al. (2012), which is the 
ranking of industries based on residual wage dispersion (measured in terms of standard 
deviation). The sample to construct jIndCoord2  is based on individual-level data taken 
from the IPUMS American Community Survey (ACS) 2008–2012 5-year sample (Ruggles et 
al. 2015), which represent the 5% random sample of the US population. The use of a 5-year 
sample is appropriate because estimating industry-specific wage regressions requires large 
sample sizes. The time period 2008–2012 is chosen because the new industry classification 
began from 2008. Although this ACS sample is different from the one used by Bombardini et 
al. (2012), which is the 5% PUMS files of the 2000 Census of Population in the US, I 
generally follow their procedure as much as the data allow.  
The sample is first restricted to full-time workers (usually worked at least 20 hours 
per week, worked for wages at least 14 weeks during the past year, and earned an annual 
salary of at least 2,000 USD), aged 16–65 years, and not living in group quarters. Different 
from the 2000 Census, the ACS sample does not provide the exact number of weeks worked.1 
Thus, to reduce the measurement error of weekly wages, the sample is further restricted to 
those who report weeks worked as either “48–49 weeks” or “50–52 weeks.” Then, weekly 
wages are computed as the annual wage and salary income divided by the week worked (48.5 
in case of 48–49 weeks, or 51 in case of 50–52 weeks).  
Using this sample, the following industry-specific wage equation is estimated:  
                       ijijij εXWage += j)log( β ,                     (A1) 
where subscripts i and j denote individual and industry where she is working, respectively. 
ijWage  denotes weekly wage. ijX  is a vector of individual characteristics including four 
1 ACS just provides interval information on weeks worked (1–13 weeks; 14–26 weeks; 27–39 weeks; 
40–47 weeks; 48–49 weeks; and 50–52 weeks). 
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educational attainment categories, a quartic polynomial in age, gender, race dummies, an 
interaction of gender and race, Hispanic dummy, and state of residence dummies. In addition, 
as Bombardini et al. (2012) do following Dahl (2002), self-selection into industries is 
corrected. In particular, a cubic polynomial in the estimated first-best selection probability 
( ijpˆ ) and in the highest predicted probability for industry j ( j  p max ij ∀= }ˆ{ ) is included in 
ijX , where ijpˆ  is estimated by the following procedure.  
 First, individuals are divided into cells defined by state of birth (foreign countries are 
excluded from the sample), four categories of educational attainment (high school dropout or 
lower, high school graduate, 1–3 years of college education, four years of college education 
or higher), four age intervals (16–30, 31–40, 41–50, and 51–65), two race groups (white and 
non-white), and two gender groups (male and female). Then, the selection probability ijpˆ  is 
calculated as the proportion of individuals working in industry j within i’s cell.  
The standard deviation of the obtained industry-specific residual wage ijεˆ  (=
ijij XWage jˆ)ln( β− ) is further regressed on the coefficient of variation of firm size within 
industry j ( jFirmSizeCV ). The industry-specific firm size dispersion data is constructed from 
the Statistics of US Businesses (SUSB) data taken from the US Small Business 
Administration website2 and is calculated as follows: 
jjbjbj AvgEmpEmpEmpAvgEmpAvgEmpFirmSizeCV //*)(
224
b
−= ∑ , 
where subscript b denotes 1–24 bins defined by employment size of firm, which ranges from 
0–4 persons (the first bin) to 5,000 and more persons (the last bin). bAvgEmp  and 
jAvgEmp  are average employment size per firm in bin b and industry j, respectively. bEmp  
and jEmp  are total employment in bin b and industry j, respectively.
3 
Finally, the industry-specific residuals from this regression (that regresses the 
standard deviation of residual in equation (A1) on industry’s firm size dispersion) are 
arranged in descending order and their ranks are used as jIndCoord2 .   
2 https://www.sba.gov/advocacy/firm-size-data (accessed May 26, 2016) 
3 Exact number of total employment is missing in some bins to protect confidentiality. In these cases, I 
replace the employment range code with (i) the average employment number within the range, or (ii) 
with the bin’s minimum employment size if it is greater than (i).  
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Figure A1. Average Scores of Countries’ Decentralization Index: Decent2 
Note: For the definition of Decent2, see Section 4.2.1. 
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Figure A2. Average Scores of Industries’ Decentralization Index: Decent2 
Notes: For the definition of Decent2, see Section 4.2.1. Industry code number is in parentheses. For 
industry classification, see Appendix Table 1. 
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Figure A3. Decent1 and IndCoord1 by Level of SocK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Each data point plots the weighted average Decent1 and IndCoord1 of the cell defined by 
country and industry. Cells with fewer than 30 observations are excluded from the sample (PIAAC’s 
sampling weight is used). The left and right plots are based on countries with low and high average 
SocK, (i.e., high and low average self-centeredness of workers), respectively. The countries with low 
(respectively, high) SocK include the top (bottom) half countries (among non-italic countries that have 
IndCoord1 data) in the corresponding SocK column in Table 4.3. For the definitions of variables, see 
Section 4.2.   
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Table A1. Description of Variables and Summary Statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Decent1 Decentralization index 1. See Section 4.2.1. -0.044 0.794 
Decent2 Decentralization index 2. See Section 4.2.1. -0.034 0.670 
IndCoord1 Coordination needs of affiliated industry (Index 1 based on 34 industries) See Section 4.2.2. 2.165 0.509 
IndCoord2 Coordination needs of affiliated industry (Index 2 based on 71 industries) See Section 4.2.2. 30.968 18.447 
Trust1_piaac Region’s social capital representing self-centeredness of workers. See Table 4.2 2.238 0.302 
Trust1_wvs See Trust1_piaac 0.387 0.173 
Trust2_piaac See Trust1_piaac 2.282 0.413 
Vol_piaac See Trust1_piaac 1.462 0.207 
Vol_wvs See Trust1_piaac 0.193 0.159 
Wealth_wvs See Trust1_piaac 5.957 0.784 
Female Dummy: 1 if female, 0 if male 0.506 0.500 
Age Age 39.347 12.653 
Exp Years of work (paid work) experience 17.420 12.368 
Tenure Years of tenure at the current employer 7.712 9.156 
Eduy Years of education 12.405 2.584 
Health Health status (1 = poor–5 = excellent) 3.425 1.007 
Forborn Dummy: 1 if born in a foreign country, 0 otherwise 0.093 0.291 
Forlang Dummy: 1 if PIAAC's test language is different from native language, 0 if same 0.076 0.264 
Occ: Tech/AssoPro Dummy: 1 if technician or associate professional, 0 otherwise 0.174 0.379 
Occ: Clerks Dummy: 1 if clerk, 0 otherwise 0.154 0.361 
Occ: Service/Sales Dummy: 1 if service worker or shop and market sales worker, 0 otherwise 0.260 0.438 
Occ: Craft Dummy: 1 if craft and related trades worker, 0 otherwise 0.151 0.358 
Occ: Operator 
/Assembler 
Dummy: 1 if plant and machine operator or assembler, 0 
otherwise 0.133 0.339 
Occ: Elementary Dummy: 1 if elementary occupations, 0 otherwise 0.129 0.335 
ICTwork 
Mean of seven standardized scores on ICT use frequency on a 
5-point scale: 1) using e-mail, 2) using the internet to better 
understand issues related to the work, 3) conducting 
transactions on the internet, 4) using spreadsheet software, 5) 
using a word processor, 6) using a programming language to 
program or write computer code, 7) participating in real-time 
discussions on the internet, in the job 
-0.005 0.706 
ReadWork 
Mean of eight standardized scores on reading frequency on a 
5-point scale:1) directions or instructions, 2) letters, memos, or 
e-mails, 3) articles in newspapers, magazines, or newsletters, 4) 
articles in professional journals or scholarly publications, 5) 
books, 6) manuals or reference materials, 7) bills, invoices, bank 
-0.015 0.628 
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statements or other financial statements, 8) diagrams, maps, or 
schematics, in the job 
WriteWork 
Mean of four standardized scores on writing frequency on a 
5-point scale: 1) writing letters, memos, or e-mails, 2) writing 
articles for newspapers, magazines, or newsletters, 3) writing 
reports, 4) filling in forms, in the job 
0.007 0.673 
NumWork 
Mean of six standardized scores on numeracy frequency on a 
5-point scale: 1) calculating prices, costs or budgets, 2) using or 
calculating fractions, decimals or percentages, 3) using a 
calculator, 4) preparing charts, graphs or tables, 5) using simple 
algebra or formulas, 6) using more advanced math or statistics 
such as calculus, complex algebra, trigonometry or use of 
regression techniques, in the job 
0.004 0.684 
LitSkill Literacy proficiency scores based on PIAAC’s direct skill assessment 270.963 44.195 
NumSkill Numeracy proficiency scores based on PIAAC’s direct skill assessment 266.761 47.638 
Fulltime Dummy:1 if usual work hours per week are 30 hours or more, 0: otherwise 0.779 0.415 
Permanent Dummy: 1 if having an indefinite employment contract, 0 otherwise 0.709 0.454 
Estsize: 1-10 Dummy:1 if the employment size of the workplace is 1–10 
people, 0 otherwise 
0.290 0.454 
Estsize: 11-50 Dummy:1 if the employment size of the workplace is 11–50 
people, 0 otherwise 
0.311 0.463 
Estsize: 51-250 Dummy:1 if the employment size of the workplace is 51–250 
people, 0 otherwise 
0.223 0.416 
Estsize: 251-1000 Dummy:1 if the employment size of the workplace is 251–1000 
people, 0 otherwise 
0.111 0.315 
Estsize: 1000+  Dummy:1 if the employment size of the workplace is more than 1000 people, 0 otherwise 0.065 0.246 
PartOfFirm Dummy: 1 if the workplace is a part of a larger firm or organization, 0 if not 0.593 0.491 
PrivateSector Dummy: 1 if working in private sector, 0 otherwise 0.765 0.424 
PublicSector Dummy: 1 if working in public sector, 0 otherwise 0.213 0.409 
NPOSector Dummy: 1 if working in a non-profit organization, 0 otherwise 0.022 0.147 
IndExpor % of final goods exports in industry output 18.069 19.832 
IndImpor % of imports (intermediate and final goods) in industry output 19.330 55.672 
Industry 1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 0.013 0.114 
Industry 2 Mining and quarrying 0.004 0.062 
Industry 3 Food products, beverages and tobacco 0.031 0.174 
Industry 4 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 0.010 0.099 
Industry 5 Wood and products of wood and cork 0.006 0.080 
Industry 6 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 0.013 0.113 
Industry 7 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.001 0.034 
Industry 8 Chemicals and chemical products 0.014 0.116 
Industry 9 Rubber and plastics products 0.008 0.090 
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Industry 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.009 0.093 
Industry 11 Basic metals 0.006 0.078 
Industry 12 Fabricated metal products 0.020 0.139 
Industry 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 0.025 0.156 
Industry 14 Computer, Electronic and optical equipment 0.013 0.113 
Industry 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 0.010 0.098 
Industry 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.025 0.156 
Industry 17 Other transport equipment 0.006 0.077 
Industry 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 0.016 0.126 
Industry 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 0.011 0.104 
Industry 20 Construction 0.070 0.255 
Industry 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repair services 0.165 0.371 
Industry 22 Hotels and restaurants 0.056 0.229 
Industry 23 Transport and storage 0.061 0.239 
Industry 24 Post and telecommunications 0.021 0.142 
Industry 25 Financial intermediation 0.027 0.161 
Industry 26 Real estate  0.008 0.091 
Industry 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 0.003 0.052 
Industry 28 Computer and related services 0.007 0.083 
Industry 29 R&D and other business services 0.069 0.254 
Industry 30 Public administration and defense, compulsory social security 0.066 0.248 
Industry 31 Education 0.036 0.185 
Industry 32 Health and social work 0.123 0.328 
Industry 33 Other community, social and personal services 0.046 0.209 
Industry 34 Private households with employed persons 0.004 0.064 
CZE Czech Republic 0.083 0.276 
DNK Denmark 0.084 0.277 
FRA France 0.068 0.252 
DEU Germany 0.082 0.275 
IRL Ireland 0.064 0.244 
JPN Japan 0.087 0.282 
KOR Korea 0.067 0.250 
NLD Netherlands 0.073 0.260 
POL Poland 0.066 0.248 
RUS Russia 0.058 0.234 
SVK Slovak Republic 0.072 0.258 
ESP Spain 0.060 0.237 
SWE Sweden 0.072 0.258 
UK United Kingdom 0.065 0.246 
Notes: The summary statistics are based on the regression sample (column 1 or 2 in Table 6.1 with 
25,475 observations) when using Decent1, IndCoord1, and Trust1_piaac, except the following 
variables: IndCoord2 (number of observations is 23,633), Trust1_wvs (25,253), Trust2_piaac (25,475), 
Vol_piaac (25,475), Vol_wvs (15,265), Wealth_wvs (22,780), and Exp, Tenure, Forlang, and 
Permanent (24,549). Industry classification is based on IndCoord1. Both mean and standard 
deviations are computed using the “repest” command in Stata (weight is revised as explained in 
Section 3).   
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Table A2. Pairwise Correlation among Decentralization Indices and their Components  
 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Decent1 Decent2 
Q1 1 
        
Q2 0.672 1 
       
Q3 0.560 0.617 1 
      
Q4 0.378 0.341 0.335 1 
     
Q5 0.368 0.328 0.285 0.194 1 
    
Q6 0.425 0.374 0.347 0.264 0.646 1 
   
Q7 0.167 0.163 0.121 0.117 0.274 0.262 1 
  
Decent1 0.835 0.842 0.805 0.651 0.376 0.450 0.182 1 
 
Decent2 0.772 0.756 0.707 0.564 0.669 0.716 0.453 0.894 1 
Notes: Correlations are calculated at the individual (non-managerial and non-supervisory workers 
having region information) level using the “repest” command in Stata (weight is revised as explained 
in Section 3). All correlations are statistically significant at 1% level. Q1–Q7 correspond to PIAAC 
questions (i)–(vii) in Section 4.2.1, respectively. For more details, see Section 4.2.1. 
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Table A3. Industry Need for Coordination: Sorted by 71 Industries Based on IndCoord2  
Sector Industry Description IndCoord2 Sector Industry Description IndCoord2 
S Real estate activities 1 S Residential care activities 37 
S Motion picture, video and television program production, sound recording and music publishing activities 2 M Manufacture of food products 38 
S 
Creative, arts and entertainment activities, gambling and 
betting activities, sports activities and amusement and 
recreation activities  
3 M Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 39 
S Employment activities 4 M Manufacture of beverages 40 
S Legal and accounting activities 5 M Manufacture of leather and related products 41 
S Other professional, scientific and technical activities 6 S Scientific research and development 42 
S Activities of membership organizations 7 S Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 43 
S Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 8 S Repair and installation of machinery and equipment, repair of computers and personal and household goods 44 
S Activities of head offices, management consultancy activities 9 M Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 45 
S Food and beverage service activities 10 M Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 46 
P Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities 11 (S) 
Sewerage, waste collection, treatment and disposal 
activities; materials recovery, remediation activities and 
other waste management services 
47 
S Office administrative, office support and other business support activities 12 S Education 48 
S Other personal service activities 13 M Printing and reproduction of recorded media 49 
S Accommodation 14 M Manufacture of textiles 50 
S Services to buildings and landscape activities 15 M 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plait 
51 
P Mining support service activities 16 P Fishing and aquaculture 52 
S Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding , insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, 17 M Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 53 
 63 
 
 
except compulsory social security, activities auxiliary to 
financial service and insurance activities 
S Advertising and market research 18 S Postal and courier activities 54 
S Travel agency, tour operator, reservation service and related activities 19 M Manufacture of tobacco products 55 
M Manufacture of wearing apparel 20 (S) Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply water collection, treatment and supply  56 
S Rental and leasing activities 21 S Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis 57 
S Publishing activities, programming and broadcasting activities, telecommunications, information service activities 22 M Manufacture of electrical equipment 58 
S Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities 23 M Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 59 
S Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 24 M Manufacture of furniture 60 
S Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 25 M Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 61 
S Veterinary activities 26 P Forestry and logging 62 
S Warehousing and support activities for transportation 27 M Manufacture of machinery and equipment nec. 63 
M Other manufacturing 28 M Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 64 
S Social work activities without accommodation 29 P Mining of coal and lignite 65 
S Security and investigation activities 30 M Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 66 
S Human health activities 31 M Manufacture of paper and paper products 67 
P Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 32 M Manufacture of basic metals 68 
S Air transport 33 P Other mining and quarrying 69 
S Water transport 34 M Manufacture of other transport equipment 70 
(S) Construction of buildings, civil engineering, specialized construction activities 35 P Mining of metal ores 71 
S Land transport and transport via pipelines 36    
Notes: Figures are weighted average scores across 18 countries with 2-digit level industry codes (ISIC Rev. 4). For the definition of IndCoord2, see Section 
4.2.2. P, M, and S in the column “Sector” denote primary, manufacturing, and service sectors, respectively.  
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Table A4. Pairwise Correlation among Social Capital Variables  
 
  Trust1_piaac Trust1_wvs Trust2_piaac Vol_piaac Vol_wvs Wealth_wvs 
Trust1_piaac 1           
Trust1_wvs 0.816 1         
Trust2_piaac 0.711 0.768 1       
Vol_piaac 0.544 0.683 0.446 1     
Vol_wvs 0.396 0.380 0.180 0.322 1   
Wealth_wvs 0.305 0.346 0.203 0.245 0.484 1 
 
Notes: Correlations are calculated at the individual (non-managerial and non-supervisory workers 
having region information) level using the “repest” command in Stata (weight is revised as explained 
in Section 3). All correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level. For the definitions of each 
variable, see Table 4.2. 
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Table A5. Other Determinants of Decentralization (Decent2) 
SocK =
(3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4)
IndCoord1 -0.319 *** -0.296 *** -0.142 *** -0.134 *** -0.251 *** -0.232 *** -0.249 *** -0.233 *** -0.127 *** -0.118 *** -0.272 *** -0.228 ***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.032) (0.032) (0.060) (0.058) (0.073) (0.072) (0.034) (0.034) (0.071) (0.071)
SocK -0.130 * -0.294 * -0.192 *** -0.143 -0.348 ** -0.059 **
(0.072) (0.153) (0.068) (0.106) (0.161) (0.024)
IndCoord1*SocK 0.110 *** 0.103 *** 0.175 *** 0.176 *** 0.079 *** 0.074 *** 0.121 ** 0.115 ** 0.230 *** 0.223 *** 0.031 *** 0.025 **
(0.031) (0.031) (0.055) (0.056) (0.024) (0.023) (0.048) (0.047) (0.062) (0.066) (0.010) (0.010)
Female -0.027 *** -0.023 ** -0.030 *** -0.026 *** -0.027 *** -0.024 ** -0.027 *** -0.023 ** -0.014 -0.011 -0.026 *** -0.022 **
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Age 0.004 * 0.004 * 0.004 * 0.004 * 0.004 0.004 *
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Age^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exp 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Exp^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 * 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.003 * 0.003 * 0.003 * 0.003 * 0.003 * 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Eduy 0.014 *** 0.015 *** 0.014 *** 0.015 *** 0.013 *** 0.015 *** 0.013 *** 0.015 *** 0.014 *** 0.015 *** 0.014 *** 0.015 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LitSkill 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NumSkill 0.000 * 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 * 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 * 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Health 0.019 *** 0.019 *** 0.018 *** 0.017 *** 0.019 *** 0.019 *** 0.019 *** 0.019 *** 0.024 *** 0.023 *** 0.019 *** 0.018 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Forborn -0.093 *** -0.084 *** -0.094 *** -0.084 *** -0.093 *** -0.083 *** -0.092 *** -0.084 *** -0.106 *** -0.096 *** -0.094 *** -0.083 ***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.029) (0.021) (0.022)
Forlang -0.042 * -0.043 * -0.040 -0.043 * -0.041 -0.043 * -0.041 * -0.044 * -0.047 -0.048 -0.046 * -0.047 *
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.031) (0.027) (0.028)
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SocK =
(3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4)
Occ: Tech/AssoPro 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.022 0.027 0.020 0.020 0.018
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017)
Occ: Clerks -0.036 ** -0.038 ** -0.037 ** -0.037 ** -0.035 ** -0.038 ** -0.036 ** -0.039 ** -0.033 * -0.042 ** -0.040 *** -0.042 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
Occ: Service/Sales -0.050 *** -0.048 *** -0.050 *** -0.050 *** -0.049 *** -0.048 *** -0.050 *** -0.050 *** -0.051 *** -0.055 *** -0.053 *** -0.053 ***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014)
Occ: Craft 0.009 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.005 -0.005 0.003 -0.004
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018)
Occ: Operator -0.150 *** -0.154 *** -0.153 *** -0.157 *** -0.152 *** -0.156 *** -0.153 *** -0.156 *** -0.168 *** -0.178 *** -0.159 *** -0.164 ***
          /Assembler (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
ICTwork 0.138 *** 0.136 *** 0.139 *** 0.136 *** 0.137 *** 0.136 *** 0.138 *** 0.136 *** 0.145 *** 0.144 *** 0.134 *** 0.132 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
ReadWork 0.199 *** 0.195 *** 0.199 *** 0.196 *** 0.200 *** 0.196 *** 0.199 *** 0.195 *** 0.203 *** 0.200 *** 0.200 *** 0.196 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
WriteWork 0.057 *** 0.056 *** 0.057 *** 0.056 *** 0.057 *** 0.056 *** 0.056 *** 0.056 *** 0.049 *** 0.049 *** 0.054 *** 0.054 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
NumWork 0.102 *** 0.102 *** 0.103 *** 0.102 *** 0.102 *** 0.102 *** 0.102 *** 0.102 *** 0.110 *** 0.108 *** 0.106 *** 0.106 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Fulltime -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 -0.004 -0.006
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Permanent 0.055 *** 0.044 *** 0.053 *** 0.043 *** 0.054 *** 0.044 *** 0.055 *** 0.045 *** 0.050 *** 0.037 *** 0.052 *** 0.042 ***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
Estsize: 11-50 -0.114 *** -0.114 *** -0.114 *** -0.114 *** -0.114 *** -0.114 *** -0.114 *** -0.115 *** -0.105 *** -0.105 *** -0.113 *** -0.113 ***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Estsize: 51-250 -0.127 *** -0.129 *** -0.128 *** -0.129 *** -0.127 *** -0.129 *** -0.127 *** -0.129 *** -0.111 *** -0.113 *** -0.129 *** -0.130 ***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
Estsize: 251-1000 -0.149 *** -0.153 *** -0.147 *** -0.152 *** -0.148 *** -0.154 *** -0.148 *** -0.153 *** -0.136 *** -0.140 *** -0.145 *** -0.149 ***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017)
Estsize: 1000+ -0.108 *** -0.111 *** -0.107 *** -0.110 *** -0.106 *** -0.111 *** -0.106 *** -0.112 *** -0.077 *** -0.085 *** -0.104 *** -0.108 ***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021)
PartOfFirm -0.032 *** -0.035 *** -0.032 *** -0.034 *** -0.033 *** -0.035 *** -0.033 *** -0.036 *** -0.024 ** -0.027 ** -0.031 *** -0.034 ***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
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Notes: The dependent variable is Decent2. Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using jackknife replicate weights with the “repest” command in Stata 
(weight is revised as explained in Section 3). The column numbers (3) and (4) indicate that the results are identical to those with the same column numbers in 
Table 6.1. Elementary occupation, establishment size of 1–10, and private sector are the omitted reference groups. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
 
SocK =
(3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4)
PublicSector -0.041 *** -0.048 *** -0.043 *** -0.048 *** -0.042 *** -0.049 *** -0.043 *** -0.050 *** -0.045 ** -0.054 *** -0.038 ** -0.044 ***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
NPOSector 0.056 * 0.050 * 0.054 * 0.046 0.056 * 0.049 * 0.059 * 0.052 * 0.064 ** 0.054 * 0.062 ** 0.055 *
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
IndExpor -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
IndImpor 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.339 0.344 0.339 0.344 0.339 0.344 0.339 0.344 0.347 0.350 0.339 0.343
Observations 24544 24446 24352 24253 24544 24446 24544 24446 14417 14362 21898 21807
Trust1_piaac Trust1_wvs Trust2_piaac Vol_piaac Vol_wvs Wealth_wvs
 68 
